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ABSTRACT:
This paper applies moral perception theory to the feminist pornography debate.
According to Rebecca Kukla, moral perception is “the perception of normatively
contoured objects and states of affairs, where that perception enables us to engage in
practical reason and judgement concerning these particulars” (319). Her explanation of
moral perception includes the concept of moral blindness. Moral blindness is the way in
which people fail to see moral particulars.
This paper identifies the ways in which feminists on both sides of the
pornography debate appear to be morally blind to the opinions of those on the other. The
hope of this paper is that in identifying the instances of moral blindness within the
feminist pornography debate, they can be avoided. If moral blindness is successfully
avoided, each side will be better able to appreciate the views expressed by the other,
allowing for a less adversarial and more productive discussion of pornography.
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Introduction
I became interested in studying pornography a few years ago after discussing sex
with a friend of mine. She was telling me about how her date the night before ended in
sex (well, she didn’t really tell me, so much as make a guilty looking face, as though she
was doing a bad job of hiding a secret, and say “you know”, but that got the message
across just the same) and I asked her how it was.
“Amazing” she said, “He loved it”.
“That’s great” I replied, “but how was it?”
“Oh” she said with an understanding smile, “I looked great. That new bra did the
trick.”
“That’s great” I replied again, unsure of what trick she was referring to, “But how
was it?”
“Oh” she said, certain she knew what I was asking this time “Cosmo was totally
right, their sex tips really do drive men crazy. Let’s just say he was one happy boy last
night”.
“Also, great, but how was it?”
She paused, confused and unsure what I was asking. “How many orgasms did
you have?” I clarified.
She looked at me as though I were speaking a language she didn’t understand and
continued to tell me more about what she wore and how he reacted, eventually pointing
to a picture on the cover Maxim that inspired her bra choice.
I found it odd that she didn’t refer to her sexual pleasure once, even when
explicitly asked. Where did she get this idea that sex meant a ‘sexy’ looking woman and

1
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a sexually satisfied man? Was it from these magazines? Did Maxim and Cosmo count as
pornography? What was pornography anyway? Did pornography and other media really
teach my friend, and many others, this male pleasure oriented definition of sex?
To find answers to these questions I began to read about pornography. More
specifically, I began reading feminist interpretations and explanations of pornography.
While doing this research, I found all sorts of conflicting information. Much of what I
read told me that using and producing pornography had serious negative consequences: it
told women to cater to men’s desires and ignore their own; it taught men that they had a
right to women’s bodies regardless of women’s consent; and it was produced by the
abuse and coercion of women. Yet much of what I read told me that the use and
production of pornography had many positive effects: it taught women how to explore
their sexuality; it celebrated women’s bodies; and it was produced by fully consenting,
feminist women.
Not only was I confronted with conflicting information, but I also noticed that the
topic of pornography created a schism amongst feminists, dividing us into pro- and antipornography groups. These groups tended to personally and intellectually attack each
other. They called each other names, ridiculed each other’s theories, and just plain
ignored those who disagreed with their own views about pornography.
I needed a way to make sense of the conflicting information that I found and a
way to tell the difference between what is pornography and what is not. I also wanted a
way to unite pro- and anti-pornography feminisms to allow for an open discussion about
pornography, instead of creating more support for one side of a seemingly hopeless
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deadlock between two opposing groups. I found that moral perception theory provided
the framework necessary to achieve these goals.
Thesis Goals
This paper analyses and re-conceptualizes the feminist pornography debate
through the lens o f moral perception theory. It does so by identifying the different ways
in which feminists on both sides of the pornography debate appear to be morally blind to
the opinions and theories that oppose their own.
In this paper I make no claims about which moral principles should be applied,
nor do I attempt to resolve the feminist pornography debate. Instead, I use moral
perception theory to re-conceptualize the feminist pornography debate to allow both sides
to listen to and learn from each other. This will provide a framework that feminists can
use to reconcile their difference of opinion in order to resolve and renew the discussion
about the morality o f pornography.
Moral Perception
According to Rebecca Kukla’s article “Attention and Blindness: Objectivity and
Contingency in Moral Perception”, moral perception is, “the perception of normatively
contoured objects and states of affairs, where that perception enables us to engage in
practical reason and judgement concerning these particulars” (319). Moral perception is
that which enables us to see which particulars of an object or situation affect the morality
of the actions we decide to, or not to, take. In any situation, the more relevant
information we have, the better able we are to understand the situation. This better
understanding makes us better able to see and thus to do what is morally correct. This is
because, “in order for moral principles to successfully govern action and judgement, we

3
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need the capacity to see how they are properly brought to bear on particular situations”
(Kukla 320). Thus, the more morally relevant information we perceive, the better able we
are to understand the situation and the better able we are to apply moral principles to it
and do what is morally right.
Kukla examines cognition as it relates to morality, so for Kukla, morality and
epistemology are linked. She explores how perception gives reason and as such enables
warrant, belief and inference. “[G]ood perception is that which yields warranted truths
about a real, independent world that stands as the tribunal of the truth of its deliverances”
(334-335). Thus there is a real world that we can learn about and because of our different
personal histories we have the ability to perceive different aspects of this reality. As she
explains, “[tjhe varying structure of our perceptual capacities, resulting from our various
contingent histories and positions, will allow different moral facts to show up to different
people” (Kukla 338). Kukla also maintains that these perceptual capacities can be taught
(339). Thus correcting and improving our moral perception is both a moral and an
epistemic issue because the more we learn to see the more we can know and the better
able we are to know and do what is morally right (339).
According to Kukla, universality is not a requirement for objectivity, but a
guiding principle of it (345). This means that what is objective is not what everyone
perceives because we all are equipped to see different truths about the world, but we
should aim to learn as many ways to see the world as possible so that we can perceive
more truth. So, we should try to make what we know universal both by teaching others
what we know and trying to learn to see more from others, but something needn’t be
universally accessible to be objective because some people will not want to learn to see.

4
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In developing this theory about “what is involved in achieving accurate, robustly
objective moral perception” (321), Kukla briefly identifies four different types of moral
blindness that impair moral perception. The first type is when we avert our attention
from something because we know that if we look at it, we will see that it is morally
wrong and we would have to act on that knowledge. Because we do not want to get
involved, nor do we want to acknowledge that we should be doing something, we avert
our gaze so that we do not see what is going on so that we do not have to do anything
about it. “Here, we fail to pay attention to something that would make a moral claim on
us if we acknowledged it. It is our attention rather than our capacity for perception that is
deficient here” (Kukla 328). For convenience’s sake, I will call this type of blindness
“aversion blindness”. To illustrate aversion blindness clearly, Kukla provides the
example of a teacher who ignores signs of abuse on a child’s body so that the teacher
does not have to do anything about the abuse. This type of blindness can be corrected by
paying attention to what there is to see (Kukla 329).
The second type o f blindness is when we do pay attention to the situation, but we
see it incorrectly because of our own self-absorption. We see only what is personally
relevant to us. It is not that we fail to see anything morally relevant, as is the case with
aversion blindness, but that, “because of our lack o f attention, w e.. .see it incorrectly
because of the distortions o f self-absorption” (Kukla 328). I will refer to this type of
blindness as “self-absorption blindness”. Self-absorption is involved in aversion
blindness as well, but in a different way. With aversion blindness we either intentionally
avoid perceiving something or our self-absorption distracts us from certain morally
relevant particulars. With self-absorption blindness, our self-absorption does more than

5
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distract our gaze from certain particulars. When we participate in self-absorption
blindness, our self-absorption actually allows us to perceive morally relevant particulars
incorrectly (Kukla 328). Kukla provides an example of self-absorption blindness: a
Christian tourist remembered seeing rows of crosses in Arlington Cemetery instead of the
tombstones that were actually there because crosses had more emotional relevance for
her. Again, as with aversion blindness, this is a matter o f attention. If we pay adequate
attention and do not allow our “idiosyncratic interests and interpretations” (Kukla 328) to
distort our perceptions, we can avoid self-absorption blindness.
The third type of blindness that Kukla identifies consists of our beliefs causing us
to perceive incorrectly. For instance, when we stereotype people, we do not see their
actions or hear their words for what they are. Instead, we see these stereotypes come to
life in their actions and hear them in their speech even though the properties of these
stereotypes are not actually present. This “issues from a defect in the perceptual
capacities themselves, rather than from our efforts at employing these capacities through
attention” (Kukla 329). I will refer to this type of blindness as “defective perception”.
The difference between self-absorption blindness and defective perception is that with the
former we perceive certain morally relevant particulars incorrectly because our self
absorption convinces us not to pay close enough attention to these particulars. With the
latter, we pay close attention to these particulars, but still perceive them incorrectly.
With defective perception moral blindness occurs at the level of perception, while self
absorption blindness is a matter of inattention. Kukla’s example of defective perception
is of people hearing shrill tones in women’s voices when they discuss their discomforts in
the work place, when no such tones exist. When defective perception occurs it is no

6
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longer a matter of inadequate attention. Instead, we perceive incorrectly, which means
that defective perception cannot be corrected merely by paying more attention. With
defective perception we have to become more involved in the situation so that we can
leam more about it. Doing so will allow us to see beyond our stereotypes and will
mitigate defective perception (Kukla 330).
The fourth type of blindness is when “our perception is not incorrect but
incomplete” (Kukla 330). This is when we see a situation clearly, but we still do not
understand it because we do not have enough information to interpret what we see
correctly. I refer to this type o f blindness as “incomplete perception”. Here the problem
is not that we see incorrectly in any way, but that the detail in which we see is not finetuned enough to pick up all o f the relevant information. These details that we cannot see
precisely enough to understand the meanings of what we perceive leave us
misinterpreting the situation. With incomplete perception, we do not understand which
particulars require our attention because we do not see in enough detail for us to correctly
interpret the moral significance of what we see. To further explain incomplete perception
Kukla describes an example of people seeing two women being affectionate and
assuming that they are sisters because these people do not know enough about the
situation to recognize that they are lovers. As is the case with defective perception,
incomplete perception is not a result of inattention. In order to rectify this type of moral
blindness, we must immerse ourselves in the situation in order to leam more about it so
that we can know which details require our attention and how we should act upon what
we see (Kukla 330).
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Although these types o f blindness are conceptually distinct, instances of moral
blindness often incorporate more than one type of blindness. For example, if we
participate in aversion blindness and avert our gaze from something that might make a
moral claim upon us, we may also participate in self-absorption blindness because, for
instance, with the brief glance that we give the child when we do not successfully avert
our gaze, we will see a child without signs of abuse because that is what our self
absorption would like us to see. Similarly, if through defective perception, we perceive
shrill tones in a woman’s voice, we may perceive these tones because of self-absorption
blindness. It is easier for us to believe that this woman fits a stereotype of an overly
sensitive and overly political irate person than to believe that there is sexism in our
workplace. This also includes elements of aversion blindness because we avert our
attention from the complaints that this woman is making by hearing shrill tones in her
voice and assuming that she is upset without proper reason so that we need not to take her
complaints seriously. Hence, more than one type of moral blindness can be involved in
one instance of misunderstanding.
These four types o f moral blindness explain how our perception can impair moral
judgement and thus limit our ability to act morally. In this paper I apply Kukla’s theory
of moral blindness so that it becomes a tool for identifying a variety of cognitive failings,
not just cognitive failings that are explicitly moral. Thus I use these four types of moral
blindness to show not only cognitive moral misperceptions within the feminist
pornography debate, but general cognitive failings as well.
The concept of moral perception assumes moral particularism. Moral
particularists believe that “seeing particulars well is a crucial constituent of successful

8
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moral reasoning and judgement” (Kukla 320). This is why I use particular examples of
moral blindness in the feminist pornography debate to show the importance of paying
attention to particulars when engaging in moral reasoning. Unfortunately, these
examples of feminists participating in moral blindness do not fully represent their views
because I cannot fully present their ideas about the morality of pornography in this paper.
To do so would include, at the very least, summarizing each of their works about
pornography in full. This cannot be done within the confines of this paper. Thus, when
reading each example o f moral blindness included in this paper, it is important to
remember that there is more to each author’s opinion than the example provides.
My hope here is that in identifying the instances of moral blindness on each side
of the feminist pornography debate, they can be avoided. If moral blindness is
successfully avoided, each side will be better able to see, understand, and appreciate the
views expressed by the other, allowing for a less adversarial and more productive
discussion of pornography.
Thesis Contents
This paper is based upon moral perception theory and thus I will not attempt to
debate the merits of moral particularism over ethical generalism, ontological
particularism or any other moral philosophy. Instead, this paper will show how moral
perception can be used to re-conceptualize the feminist pornography debate to unite proand anti-pornography feminisms.
This paper only examines the feminist pornography debate. Thus only feminist
works are included and analysed in this paper. In order to include a wide range of
feminist views, I have used a broad definition of feminism. I have considered as feminist

9
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any work by anyone who identifies as feminist, any work that includes and values
women’s perspectives, and any work that discusses how pornography affects women.
In addition, this paper only discusses heterosexual pornography and the
experiences of women in the sex trade. I have chosen to include neither gay and lesbian
pornography nor the experiences of non-female sex workers because the feminist
pornography debate incorporates arguments concerning gender relations and I have not
studied how, if at all, gay and lesbian pornography and non-female sex workers’
experiences affect gender relations.
Also, this paper includes women’s experiences and opinions about pornography,
prostitution, and other forms of sex work. I have chosen to incorporate prostitution and
other types of sex work within the range of pornography for two main reasons.
The first is that prostitutes, pornography actors, pornography models, exotic dancers, and
other sex workers often perform the same sexual activities as part of their work. There is
often little difference in the work women do whether their consumers experience it live or
purchase images of it after the fact. Secondly, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to
tell the difference between pornography and prostitution. For example, when a man pays
for the opportunity to tell women, via the Internet, to perform sex acts for him, it is
difficult to determine if this should be classified as pornography or prostitution. This
type of sex work consumption has elements of prostitution because this man has the
ability to request certain sex acts just as if he hired these women as prostitutes and made
these requests in person. But this type of sex work consumption also has elements of
pornography because he is watching these sex acts from a distance on a screen as though
he were viewing pornography (Whisnant 19-22). Thus, because the line between

10
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prostitution and pornography is blurred both by the experiences of women working in the
sex trade and by the various types of sex work consumption available, I include
experiences and ideas about many forms of sex work and the products and services they
create.
This paper does not apply moral perception theory to every feminist argument
available about the morality of pornography. Instead, it applies moral perception theory
to prominent arguments found within the feminist pornography debate to show how
moral perception can be used to mitigate moral blindness throughout this debate.
Thesis Outline
The first chapter of this paper discusses how both pro- and anti-pornography
feminists participate in aversion blindness. This tends to include feminists on each side
of this debate either ignoring information that does not support their beliefs about
pornography or acknowledging, but not addressing, such information. As moral
perception explains, these instances of aversion blindness can be avoided by paying full
attention to arguments on both sides of the feminist pornography debate.
In chapter two, I discuss self-absorption blindness in the feminist pornography
debate. The two most prominent examples of this are anti-pornography feminists seeing
force, degradation, or the endorsement of patriarchy in pornographic images when there
is none and pro-pornography feminists seeing the endorsement of censorship when no
mention of censorship is made. Looking at the details of each situation in which
pornography is used and produced will help mitigate self-absorption blindness because
by paying closer attention we can more accurately perceive the situations we encounter.

11
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The third chapter outlines the prominent effects of defective perception on the
feminist pornography debate. This includes how both pro- and anti-pornography
feminists tend to accuse each other of either working for or being victims of anti
feminists. Immersing ourselves in the feminist pornography debate will allow us to
determine if people are indeed victims of or parties to anti-feminist thought, or if those
who disagree with us about the morality of pornography are trying to make the world a
better place for women. Becoming more involved with and thus paying attention to the
details of the ideas and circumstances of those on both sides of the feminist pornography
debate will allow us to stop stereotyping those who disagree with us about the morality of
pornography and allow us to correctly perceive what they say. If we clearly hear what
they have to say, we can evaluate and discuss their ideas for what they really are, and not
merely for the stereotypical responses that we tend to perceive them to be.
In the fourth chapter of this paper I examine instances of incomplete perception
within the feminist pornography debate. This constitutes considering neutral facts as
evidence or proof that pornography is either moral or immoral, when these facts can
support either conclusion equally well. When we immerse ourselves in both sides of the
feminist pornography debate we see that these facts can be used to support both the claim
that pornography is moral and the claim that it is immoral. This shows that in some
circumstances these facts seem to show that pornography is immoral, while in others they
seem to show that pornography has positive moral value. Thus we leam that the details
of the situations in which pornography is produced and consumed are required in order to
understand the effects o f pornography on the morality of each situation.

12
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The fifth and final chapter of this paper outlines what these instances of moral
blindness entail for the feminist pornography debate. First, moral perception shows us
that in order to release the feminist pornography debate from the deadlock in which it
currently stands, feminists on both sides of the debate must pay close attention to the
arguments and opinions of those with opposing views about the morality of pornography.
Moral perception also sheds light on why so many definitions of pornography are
problematic: because they try to define an object (i.e., pornography) by the situations in
which it is used and produced, thus these definitions only work when the these situations
are constant, which they are not. Finally, moral perception shows that the truth of the
statement ‘pornography is immoral’ and thus ‘using pornography is immoral’ and
‘producing pornography is immoral’ varies depending upon the situations in which
pornography is used and produced.

13
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Chapter One: Aversion Blindness
Instances of aversion blindness can be found on both sides of the feminist
pornography debate. Feminists on each side tend to avert their eyes and minds from
opinions about pornography that differ from their own. This happens in two main ways.
The first involves simply ignoring those who have opinions about pornography that
oppose our own. This can include not referring to these opposing opinions, denying that
these opinions exist, and refusing to talk to those who hold such views. The second way
aversion blindness affects the feminists pornography debate involves acknowledging, but
not addressing, opinions about and experiences of pornography that differ from our own.
Here feminists do not avert their eyes from what there is to see in an attempt to avoid the
claims that seeing these particulars would bring, but instead avert their minds from the
implication of what they do see.
These instances o f aversion blindness correspond to Kukla’s example of the
teacher ignoring signs of abuse on a child. Just as the teacher averts her gaze from the
signs of abuse, feminists on both sides of the pornography debate ignore the opinions of
those on the other side of this debate so that they need not address them. If antipornography feminists acknowledged and addressed the fact that some women enjoy
pornography and find that it improves their lives, they would have to refrain from
claiming that pornography is strictly immoral. Similarly, if pro-pornography feminists
addressed and acknowledged that pornography can be harmful to women, they would
have to refrain from claiming that there is nothing immoral about pornography. Because
neither pro- nor anti-pornography feminists want to act upon the implications of

14
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addressing each other’s arguments, they participate in aversion blindness towards each
other and each other’s opinions about pornography.
1.1 Ignoring Opposing Views
The first instance o f aversion blindness within the feminist pornography debate is
that of people on either side of the debate acting as though the other side does not exist by
not mentioning it. This instance of moral blindness is more typical of anti-pornography
feminists. Many books discussing the immoral aspects of pornography do not mention
that some feminists believe that pornography is moral. For example, in her book Only
Words, MacKinnon does not discuss any possible positive aspects of pornography. She
does not acknowledge that some women enjoy pornography, that some pornography is
not sexist, or that some pornography is made without the assault or coercion of women.
This “ignores the complex variegated nature of sexually explicit expression and the
subjective, nuanced nature of any viewer’s interpretation of such expression” (Strossen
142). With this type of aversion blindness, opinions about pornography are avoided by
simply not mentioning them.
Aversion blindness within the feminist pornography debate includes not only
ignoring opinions about pornography that conflict with our own, but denying the fact
these opinions about pornography exist. One pro-pornography theorist denies that people
are offended by mainstream pornography. She states that, “there is little sexual material
being sent via modems - or any other media - that would offend a reasonable adult in
Britain” (Carol 21). This statement denies that there are people who are offended by
mainstream pornography by suggesting that these people do not exist, or if they do, they
are not reasonable enough to be of any importance.
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Anti-pornography feminists also participate in this type of aversion blindness. In
an interview with anti-pornography activists, Ann Simonton refers to “the myth of the
happy whore and the ‘pretty woman’” (354). This implies that women who enjoy sex
work do not exist, but are merely fictional women that help perpetuate the myth that no
women are abused in the making of pornography. With this type of aversion blindness,
denying the existence of women who enjoy sex work enables anti-pornography feminists
to avoid having to deal with the implications that the existence of these women have for
those who claim that women are always harmed in the making of pornography.
Another type o f aversion blindness includes people on both sides of the feminist
pornography debate refusing to converse with those who disagree with them about the
morality of pornography. This type of aversion blindness includes more than just
avoiding views that may make moral or cognitive claims upon us, but actively refusing to
converse with those who hold these views. To illustrate this type of moral blindness
using Kukla’s example of aversion blindness: instead of the teacher averting her eyes
from signs o f abuse, the teacher would refuse to listen to children who claim abuse.
Feminists who participate in this type of aversion blindness within the pornography
debate actively refuse to talk to or work with those who disagree with them about the
morality o f pornography in order to avoid the implications of these views. For example,
Avedon Carol, a pro-pomography author claims that anti-pornography research cannot be
trusted because one such researcher appears to be homophobic (23). In this way, Carol
suggests that there is no need to listen to what anti-pornography researchers say because
their research cannot be trusted. Thus, this type of blindness allows those in favour of
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pornography to conclude that people should not converse with anti-pornography
researchers.
Pro-pomography feminists are not the only ones who participate in this type of
aversion blindness. Occasionally, when anti-pornography feminists are asked to debate
the morality of pornography with pro-pomography feminists, they decline the offer. For
example, “[ljeading feminist anticensorship advocates repeatedly have been invited to
participate in such debates, only to have the invitations rescinded because of
MacKinnon’s and Dworkin’s refusal to share the podium with them” (Strossen 85).
In addition to refusing to talk to those who disagree with them about pornography,
many feminists actively suggest that those who disagree with them are enemies and
should not be consulted by anyone. Wendy McElroy, a feminist who argues that
pornography improves women’s lives, gets upset when pro- and anti-pomography
feminists work together. She states that, “[tjhose liberals who defend pornography do not
generally address the ideological underpinnings of the onslaught against it. They
continue to view anti-pom feminists as fellow travellers, instead of seeing them as
dangerous companions” (123-124). With this type of aversion blindness, opposing
opinions about pornography are avoided by refusing to converse with those who hold
these opinions and promoting the idea that those who do converse with these others are
working with the enemy.
1.2 Acknowledging Without Addressing
Aversion blindness in the feminist pornography debate is not limited to ignoring
opposing viewpoints. Often these points are acknowledged, but not addressed. This type
of aversion blindness is more typical of pro-pomography feminists. Many feminists
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involved in the making o f pornography acknowledge that other women are abused in the
sex industry, but do not acknowledge that this makes a moral claim on them. For
example, Candida Royalle, a feminist pomographer, admits that some sex workers are
taken advantage of, but instead of addressing this moral issue, she affirms that she has
never been coerced or abused. She says, “There are also some real sleazebags who will
take advantage of you and who are to be avoided.. .1 was never forced to do anything”
(542). Similarly, Crystal Wilder, a pornography actor and producer, said that she was
never coerced into doing anything that she did not want to do, but admitted that she
noticed women, especially women who were new to the work, agreeing to perform
certain sex acts that they did not want to perform. “While watching a hair-pulling scene,
for example, she became convinced that the woman.. .was not enjoying herself. She
suspected that the woman was new to the business and just going with whatever the
director wanted” (McElroy 165). With this type of aversion blindness, opposing
experiences are acknowledged, but the implications that they bring are ignored.
When feminists participate in aversion blindness they exclude women whose
experiences of and opinions about pornography differ from their own. When these
women are excluded we cannot understand them and we are unable to understand which,
if any, moral obligations we have to them. When we ignore some of the effects of
pornography on the lives of women, we do not have enough information to use moral
reasoning to determine what, if anything should be done about pornography. We, as
feminists, must look at a wide variety women’s experiences with pornography to
understand the morality of pornography.
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As Kukla explains, paying attention to the situation at hand can cure aversion
blindness. So, to minimize the affects of aversion blindness on the feminist pornography
debate we need to pay just as much attention to the opinions that contradict our own as to
the ones that support our own.
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Chapter Two: Self-Absorption Blindness

Feminists on both sides of the pornography debate participate in self-absorption
blindness: the type of blindness where we perceive only what is personally relevant.
There are many different instances of this type of blindness in the feminist pornography
debate. These instances do not seem to follow any pattern so, in order to avoid turning
this chapter into a long list of such instances, I have chosen to focus on the most
prominent example of self-absorption blindness on each side of this debate.
The most prominent example of self-absorption blindness in which propornography feminists tend to participate is that of seeing the endorsement of censorship
or anti-sex sentiment in anti-pornography arguments when it is not there. This is
especially problematic because it shifts the focus of the feminist pornography debate to
the topic of censorship instead of focusing on pornography. This shift of emphasis from
pornography to censorship confuses the debate because it obscures the difference
between the morality o f pornography and the effectiveness and morality of censorship.
The most prominent example of self-absorption blindness in which antipomography feminists participate is that o f seeing harm1 in pornography when it is not
there. This is especially problematic because it confuses the claim that pornography is
always harmful with the idea that in some contexts pornography is harmful.
These instances of self-absorption blindness correspond with Kukla’s example of
the Christian woman seeing crosses instead of tombstones at Arlington cemetery. Just as
the crosses had more significance than tombstones to the woman remembering her visit
11 do not mean to suggest that all harm is immoral. The perception o f harm is a moral perception and a
prima facia reason for negative moral evaluation, but harm does not necessitate immorality.
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to Arlington, seeing the endorsement of pro-censorship and anti-sex ideals in antipornography arguments is personally relevant to pro-pornography feminists because if all
anti-pornography feminists were pro-censorship and anti-sex, any arguments against
censorship and for sexuality might appear to show that pornography is moral. Similarly,
seeing harm in pornography is personally relevant to anti-pornography feminists because
if there were harm inherent in all pornography, anti-pornography feminists would be
correct in claiming that pornography is immoral. Thus seeing harm in pornography
(instead o f say, positive explorations of sexuality) makes the anti-pornography stance
easier to understand and accept.
These examples o f self-absorption blindness incorporate elements of other types
of blindness as well. Anti-pornography feminists seeing harm in pornographic images
and films could also be considered defective perception because this perception of harm
could been seen as happening at the level of perception, just like shrill tones may be
heard in the voice of an upset female co-worker. Also, those who promote the use of
pornography and who perceive those who criticize its use as being pro-censorship and
anti-sex, incorporate elements of aversion blindness. They fail to recognize that those
who disapprove of pornography do not always mention or advocate censorship, nor do
they usually support anti-sex ideals. This failing allows them to ignore the moral claims
that this makes on them (i.e. that arguments against censorship and for sexuality do not
equal arguments for pornography).
2.1 Censorship and Sexuality
Pro-pornography feminists often perceive the promotion of censorship within
anti-pornography arguments, even when no such ideas are mentioned. For example, Not
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a Love Story, a film showing the negative side of the pornography industry, was accused
of promoting censorship. “The film’s only statement on censorship was made by Susan
Griffin and she articulated a point of view against censorship.. .And yet the dailies
merrily published reviews suggesting that these women wanted the state to shut the
industry down” (Cole 57).
Pro-pornography feminists also tend to perceive hostility towards sex and
sexuality within anti-pornography discourse, particularly those who believe that power is
naturally and inextricably part of sex. “Some feminists are so solidly in the grip of the
sex-can-only-equal-power ideology that when [Susan Cole] suggested a real alternative to
the dynamic - i.e., a serious feminist initiative to eroticize equality in both our cultural
product and in our person sexual practice - a feminist writing for the vehemently sexpositive gay news magazine The Body Politic reported that [she] had advocated celibacy”
(Cole 42).
Often anti-pornography feminists as a whole are considered to be against
sexuality and for censorship. Some pro-pornography feminists believe that “antipornography feminists are trying to turn back the clock and shut women’s sexuality away
behind the locked doors of political correctness” (McElroy 53). As the examples above
show, this is not the case for all, or even most, anti-pornography feminists. So, when
feminists who endorse the use of pornography suggest the anti-pornography equals anti
sexuality and/or pro-censorship, they are participating in self-absorption blindness.
2.2 Harm and Pornography
Pro-pornography feminists are not the only ones who participate in self
absorption blindness. Many anti-pornography feminists see harm in pornography when
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no harm is present. For example, Andrea Dworkin, a prominent anti-pornography
feminist, claims that the mere existence of pornography shows that pornography harms
women. As she explains:
Equality for women requires material remedies for
pornography.. .Pornography’s antagonism to civil equality, integrity and
self-determination for women is absolute; and it is effective in making that
antagonism socially real and socially determining. (36)
Here Dworkin sees immorality in the fact that women pose for pornography. Since many
women pose for and enjoy using pornography without feeling depraved or any other type
of harm, Dworkin’s moral perception is hindered by self-absorption blindness whenever
she sees an attack on equality, integrity, and women’s self-determination in pornography
that has not attacked any of these qualities.
Carol Queen, a sex worker who believes she has not been harmed by her
involvement in the sex industry, explains how often anti-pornography feminists assume
that she is harmed by her clients. In her words, “many feminists.. .are quick to point out
how egregiously our clients are ‘abusing’ us simply by giving us money for sex or erotic
entertainment” (129-130). Surely there are many women who are harmed in the making
of pornography, but this is not always the case. The fact that Queen has not been harmed
through her involvement in the sex industry shows that seeing abuse as part and parcel of
sex work constitutes blindness on the part of anti-pornography feminists.
While many anti-pornography feminists believe that women are harmed in the
making of pornography, many also believe that women are harmed in the use of
pornography. Catharine MacKinnon, another prominent anti-pornography feminist, sees
harm in all pornography because she believes that all pornography promotes the idea of
and thus creates the reality of women existing to be violated by men. In her words:
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In pornography, women desire dispossession and cruelty. Men, permitted
to put words (and other things) in women’s mouths, create scenes in which
women desperately want to be bound, battered, tortured, humiliated, and
killed. Or merely taken and used. This is erotic to the male point of view.
Subjection itself, with self-determination ecstatically relinquished, is the
content of women’s sexual desire and desirability. Women are there to be
violated and possessed, men to violate and possess them, either on screen
or by camera or pen, on behalf on the viewer (“Not a Moral Issue” 171).
Thus, in all pornography MacKinnon sees sexism, even when no one was actually
harmed in the making or use of it. Surely in some circumstances pornography does cause
harm, but in others it does not. Thus it is an instance of moral blindness when antipornography feminists see harm in the use of pornography when no such harm exists.
Paying more attention to the particulars of the situation can cure these instances of
self-absorption blindness. If anti-pornography feminists pay enough attention to the
particulars of the situations in which pornography is produced and consumed, they will
notice when pornography does cause harm and when it does not. This will allow them to
see harm only when it actually exists and not when they personally believe it should
exist. Similarly, if pro-pornography feminists listen closely to what anti-pornography
feminists say, they will perceive hostility towards sexuality and the promotion of
censorship only when they are actually espoused.
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Chapter Three: Defective Perception
Defective perception occurs when our stereotypes persuade us to perceive
situations incorrectly. Defective perception affects the feminist pornography debate
where feminists on one side of this debate fail to recognize feminism in the opinions of
those on the other. Feminists disagree with each other about whether pornography
hinders or improves the lives of women, but they often misperceive the nature of their
own disagreement. Defective perception can effectively blind feminists on each side of
this debate to the feminism in the opinions of those on the other.
Feminists often fail to recognize feminism in the opinions of those who disagree
with them about the morality of pornography. The way in which they do so corresponds
with Kukla’s example o f defective perception. Like the person who hears shrill tones in a
woman’s voice while she expresses concerns about the workplace, feminists often hear
anti-feminist ideas in the opinions of those who disagree with them about the morality of
pornography. Feminists on both sides of the pornography debate fail to recognize
feminism in the opinions of those on the other side in two main ways: the first is that
feminists on each side tend to perceive those on the other as not true feminists, and the
second is that those on each side tend to perceive those on the other as helping anti
feminists. First, I will show that feminists on both sides of the pornography debate tend
to believe that those on the other are not true feminists. I will then explain why feminists
on both sides of this debate tend to think that those on the other are helping anti
feminists.
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3.1 Not True Feminists
Feminists on both sides of this debate often fail to recognize feminism in the ideas
of those who disagree with them about the morality of pornography. Defective
perception allows feminists to see those who disagree with them about the morality of
pornography as not true feminists2.
This misperception is expressed on both sides of the debate in many ways. For
example, one pro-pornography feminist refers to anti-pornography feminist theories as
“the ‘feminist’ condemnation of pornography” and “the so-called feminist definition of
pom” (Carol 53). While on the other side of the debate one anti-pornography feminist
says, “that no one who defends pornography can be a feminist” (McElroy 95).
This happens because those on each side consider themselves to be holding the
true feminist interpretation of pornography. So feminists on both sides believe that those
on the other, those who disagree with them about the effects of pornography on the lives
of women, are not true feminists because they do not really improve the lives of women.
Those who promote pornography tend to believe that those who oppose it diminish
women’s sexual freedom by limiting their use of pornography. As one pro-pomography
feminist explains: “Sexually correct history considers the graphic depiction of sex to be
the traditional and immutable enemy of women’s freedom. Exactly the opposite is true”
(McElroy 54).
Yet anti-pornography feminists tend to believe that supporting all types of
pornography is what restricts women’s freedom:

2 Unfortunately, neither pro- nor anti-pornography feminists appear to use a consistent definition o f what
being a true feminist entails. But both groups do tend to argue that those who disagree with them about the
morality o f pornography do not improve women’s lives, but actually make them worse. So, for the purpose
o f this chapter, the term ‘true feminist’ refers to someone who actually improves the lives o f women.
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The pomographer tells his customers that women have no right to speak,
only the right to get fucked, and so the pomographer works to deny us
freedom o f speech. And the recent experience of feminists attempting to
avail themselves of a public fomm in order to discuss exactly this makes
this society’s freedom of speech look like something o f a joke. As long as
there is no real equality, freedom of speech is useful only to those who
already have power. (Cole, “Power” 61)
Because feminists on each side of the pornography debate perceive that those on the other
are not actually helping women, they conclude that the beliefs of those who disagree with
them about the morality of pornography are not true feminists.
If we pay enough attention to the particulars of what is said about the morality of
pornography, we will see that both sides are equally and truly feminist. They just
disagree about whether pornography improves or hinders women’s lives.
3.2 Helping Anti-Feminists
Feminists on both sides of the pornography debate tend to say that those who
disagree with them about the morality of pornography are not real feminists because they
believe that they are helping anti-feminists, such as those on the political right , to uphold
and enforce sexist values. Feminists on both sides of this debate have two main reasons
for believing that those on the other are helping anti-feminists. Either they are really anti
feminists, or they are victims of anti-feminist thought. In other words, “[tjhese women
can be redefined as traitors or as ‘victims’ who require saving, whether or not they want
salvation” (McElroy 95). I will now discuss how feminists on both sides of this debate
mistakenly believe that those on the other are actually anti-feminists. I will then explain
how they often accuse each other of being victims of anti-feminist thought.
3 1 do not mean to suggest that everyone on the right o f the political spectrum is anti-feminist. When I use
the term ‘right wing’ in this paper I mean to refer only to those on the right side o f the political spectrum
who are anti-feminist. I use the terms ‘right-wingers’, ‘conservatives’ and the ‘political right’ to refer to
this group o f people because that is how they are referred to in the feminist writings upon which I have
based my research.
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3.2(a) Same as Anti-Feminists
Many feminists who promote the use of pornography believe that antipornography feminists actually belong to the radical right. This is because both antipornography feminists and the radical right are against pornography. Thus it can appear
as though the anti-pornography feminist, “view of pornography is identical to that of
traditional conservatism” (Feminists Against Censorship 39). Some claim that their
collaboration is a well-known fact, especially when referring to MacKinnon and
Dworkin’s ordinance. This ordinance was made to stop people from hurting women with
pornography, both in its production and its use, by allowing those who have been hurt by
pornography to civilly sue the distributors of it. “This ordinance allows anyone hurt
through pornography to prove its roll in their abuse, to recover for the deprivation of their
civil rights, and to stop it from continuing” (MacKinnon, “Only Words” 92). Many propornography feminists believe that MacKinnon aligned herself and her ideas with the
right wing to make this bill (Carol 50-51). As one pro-pornography feminist says,
“However vigorously we hear it denied, Dworkin and MacKinnon’s alliance with the
Moral Right is now well documented” (Segal 61). Yet MacKinnon explains that this is
not the case:
As the hearings document, of all the sponsors and supporters of the bill in
all the cities in which it has been introduced, only one - Beulah
Coughenour o f Indianapolis - has been conservative. Work on one bill
with an independent individual is hardly an alliance with a political wing.
And exactly what is sinister about women uniting with women across
conventional political lines against a form of abuse whose politics are
sexual has remained unspecified by the critics. (“Roar” 135)
Anti-pornography feminists also point out that they cannot be considered the
same as or working for the right wing because these two groups disapprove of
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pornography for very different reasons. Feminist writer Susan Cole outlines many of the
differences between feminist and right wing arguments against pornography. She states
that, “the right wing thinks pornography is a moral issue of good and evil, when it
actually is a political problem of power and powerlessness” (“Power” 73). Many right
wingers who are opposed to pornography say that God does not want people to have
pornography because it is evil (Cole, “Power” 69-70), whereas when anti-pornography
feminists talk about pornography, they do not speak in terms of god, but in terms of
power conflicts and the subordination of women.
Another key difference between the way conservatives and feminists evaluate
pornography is that anti-pornography feminists tend to argue against pornography
because they believe that it controls and restricts sexual freedom, while conservatives
argue against pornography because they believe that it encourages sexual freedom:
In the mind of the conservative, pornography leads to the destruction of
the family by providing an outlet for recreational sex and the expression of
anti-social sexual values. But anti-pornography feminists know that the
family is quite resilient and that plenty of family men love pornography.
As long as the family remains undemocratic, the pornography that
promotes the power imbalance between the sexes, and the family that
makes a man’s home his castle, are two very compatible things, part of the
same social order. The way that the conservative sees it, pornography
excites lust, which leads to pregnancy outside of marriage, which leads to
the heinous sin o f abortion. (Cole, “Power” 68)
Thus feminists who disapprove of pornography do so because it can promote the sexist
power hierarchy o f men in control and women as objects at men’s disposal, not because it
promotes sexuality.
Not only do feminists and conservatives oppose pornography for different
reasons, but they also have different ideas about what pornography is. They define
pornography in different ways. Anti-pornography feminists tend to think that
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pornography is sexual material that subordinates women. They have defined
pornography as “graphic sexually explicit materials that subordinate women through
pictures or words” (MacKinnon, “Only Words” 22) and “as material that combines sex
and/or the exposure of genitals with abuse or degradation in a manner that appears to
endorse, condone, or encourage such behaviour” (Russell, “Against” 3). Yet when
conservatives talk about pornography, subordination of women is not a concern.
Conservative definitions of pornography include lack of adherence to community
standards (MacKinnon, “Not a Moral Issue” 75), depictions of sex for its own sake, that
is “just for the purposes of arousal” or prurient interests (Williams 165-166), and sexually
explicit materials that encourage homosexuality (Williams 167).
Not only do feminist and right wing reasons for arguing against pornography
differ, but those in each group also refer to different things when they speak of
pornography. For anti-pornography feminists pornography is the sexual subordination of
women and, for the conservative right, pornography is, “ ‘undue exploitation of sex’
violating (undefined) ‘community standards’ ” (Williams 170). It is an incorrect
perception on the part of pro-pornography feminists to believe that anti-pornography
feminists are working for, or actually are, right-wingers, just because both right-wingers
and anti-pornography feminists disapprove of pornography. The “alliance between
feminists and right-wingers is an illusion” (Cole, “Power” 70).
Feminists who promote pornography are not the only ones who tend to accuse
those who disagree with them about the morality of pornography of belonging to the
conservative right. Some anti-pornography “feminists disown their liberal counterparts
and accuse them of working for the interests of patriarchy” (McElroy 94). Pro-

30

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

pornography feminists have been accused of being unconcerned about violence against
women (Strossen 33). One feminist who opposes pornography says that pro-pornography
feminism “has always felt more like a collaboration with oppressive forces, a sort of
suicide pact” (Ramos 45-46) than a form of feminism. In addition, pro-pomography
feminists have been called hate campaigners, apologists for pomographers (Strossen 33),
and even pomographers themselves. When Avedon Carol, member of Feminists Against
Censorship (FAC), handed out leaflets expressing anti-censorship views, “[t]he response
from the anti-pornography cadre was fierce and immediate. [FAC] members were
shouted down and called ‘pomographers’ where [they] appeared in public” (52).
These accusations are unfounded because pro-pomography feminists, like all
feminists, care about women and do not apologize for harmful pomographers, nor would
they support the conservative right. They believe that pornography does not hurt women,
so they do not oppose pornography for this reason (McElroy 127-129). Thus, propomography feminists are not working to endorse the control of women as are the
conservative right. Feminists who promote pornography just believe that pornography
helps liberate women.
3.2(b) Victims o f Anti-Feminists
When feminists on the both sides of the pornography debate do not think that
those on the other side are actually conservatives, they tend to think that they are victims
of conservative views. Thus feminists tend to believe that those who disagree with them
about the effects of pornography on the lives of women do so because they are
subscribing to sexist ideas without realizing it. Many pro-pomography feminists think
that anti-pornography feminists are victims of patriarchy because their views seem to be
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based on sexist stereotypes of men and women. Some believe that the “misogynistic
stereotypes to which [anti-pornography] feminists revert, and which they perpetuate, are
throwbacks to earlier eras and their archaic, repressive views about women, men and
sexuality” (Strossen 116).
There are three main sexist beliefs that anti-pornography feminists are accused of
upholding. The first is that men are aggressors, while women are victims; the second is
that women need to be protected from sexual images; and the third is that it is permissible
to objectify people.
3.2(b)(i) Men are Aggressors and Women are Victims:
Often in sexist traditions men are portrayed as sexual aggressors, while women
are portrayed as victims. Anti-pornography feminists are accused of upholding this
stereotype because they worry about how women are victimized by aggressive men who
use and make pornography. Some argue that the anti-pornography, “feminists’ view that
women who disagree with them are being manipulated as tools of ‘pimps’ or
‘pomographers’, and are not thinking for ourselves, conveys at least as subordinating or
degrading a view of women as does the pornography they decry” (Strossen 33). So, it
seems as though anti-pornography feminists uphold the sexist belief that men are
aggressors and women are victims.
However, feminists who oppose pornography rarely promote the belief that men
are aggressors and women are victims. Instead, they point out that pornography can
encourage men to victimize women. Thus feminists do not subscribe to the sexist belief
that all women are victims of aggressive men. Instead, they recognise that pornography
can perpetuate this belief and encourage people to act it out until it begins to resemble, or

32

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

even define, reality. Those who oppose pornography want to stop pornography from
promoting this belief before it does so to such an extent that people no longer question it.
As one anti-pornography feminist explains, pornography is:
playing a very specific role in shaping the sexual values of our culture,
particularly since pornography so hopelessly dominates the cultural
conversation about sexuality.. .these narratives and situations [are] feeding
into a rape culture, creating a generation of male sexual predators, and
now that women are getting more into it, a generation of women getting
off on sexual submission.. .it almost seems to be a perfect system of
sexuality, reinventing itself, teaching a kind o f sexuality that actually does
begin to look like it’s the norm.. .feminism is as much about
empowerment as it is about facing up to women’s victimization. (Cole,
“Power” 24-25)
Thus, there is a difference between upholding a sexist stereotype and pointing out that it
exists in order to stop it. Anti-pornography feminists do not believe that all women are
victims and that all men are aggressors. Instead, they understand that it is far more
difficult for women to empower themselves when they are being victimized by men who
learn that sexual aggression is enjoyable. They also understand that it is difficult to fight
against sexism when both men and women are learning to enjoy the subordination of
women.
3.2(b)(ii) Women Need Protection from Sexual Images:
The second sexist belief that many pro-pomography feminists mistakenly
perceive in anti-pornography feminism is that women need protection from sexually
explicit materials. It seems as though feminists who oppose pornography uphold this
sexist idea because they want people to stop using pornography. But this is not usually
the case for two main reasons. The first is that there are sexual materials that many antipornography feminists encourage women to use. Many anti-pornography feminists
promote the use of certain sexual materials, such as sex education information and non-
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sexist sexual material. So, they do not believe that women should be protected from
pornography. Instead, they believe that everyone, including women, should avoid using
sexist sexual materials (Cole, “Power” 25-27). The second reason why it is often untrue
to believe that anti-pornography feminists want to protect women from sexual images is
that much of anti-pornography activism includes showing women pornography. Many
anti-pornography feminists want women to see the pornography that is being produced
and consumed so that women will understand just how sexist it is and why it must be
stopped. Thus many anti-pornography believe that, “[mjany people are more convinced
of the harmful effects of pornography after seeing visual examples of this material than
by reading about the now considerable scientific evidence of harm” (Russell, “Against”
vii). Thus it is not that anti-pornography feminists want to protect women from images
of sex, but that they want to stop both men and women from using materials that
perpetuate the sexist idea the that subordination of women by men is sexy or even part of
the definition of sex itself.
3.2(b)(iii) Objectification is Permissible:
The third main sexist belief that anti-pornography feminists are accused of
perpetuating is that objectification is permissible. Many anti-pornography feminists
believe that pornography is immoral because it objectifies women. As one antipornography feminist explains, “[sjexual objectification is [a] common characteristic of
pornography. It refers to the portrayal of human beings - usually women - as
depersonalized sexual things” (Russell, “Against” 7). Despite the fact that feminists
oppose the objectification o f women, many feminists who oppose pornography are
accused of promoting objectification. I will first explain why anti-pornography feminists
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are often accused of promoting objectification. I will then explain that this is a
misunderstanding because most anti-pornography feminists do not.
Anti-pornography feminists are often accused of objectifying men. Katharine
MacKinnon is one such feminist. Her interpretation of pornography relies on the fact that
men are aroused by the violent and sexist images that they find in pornography. These
men then act out the violent and sexist scenes portrayed in pornography because of this
arousal. She argues that the sexist messages of pornography are “addressed directly to
the penis, delivered through an erection, and taken out on women in the real world”
(MacKinnon, “Only Words” 21). Some feminist defenders of pornography argue that
this interpretation of pornography objectifies men. They believe that:
MacKinnon’s view o f men and masculine sexuality precisely mirrors the
pornographic world which she critiques. Pornography usually involves an
abstraction or a reduction of a human being into its elemental body parts.
There is no self there, only the body reduced to the genitals in a pictorial
language of lust.. .A man becomes his penis. He cannot help it. The penis
asserts itself against him. He is reduced to a prick. (Cornell 556)
Just as anti-pornography feminists worry that pornography encourages men to treat
women as though they are nothing more than their sexual parts, pro-pomography
feminists worry that interpretations of pornography like MacKinnon’s encourage women
to see men as nothing more than their genitals.
However, anti-pornography feminists do not mean to promote this form of
objectification; they mean to point out that pornography objectifies both men and women
so that they can stop it from doing so. Many anti-pornography feminists believe that it is
pornography itself, and not interpretations of it, that reduces men (and women) to their
sexual parts. Those who oppose pornography believe that pornography encourages men
to ignore their inhibitions against harming others to do what ever will give them an
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erection because pornography can promote the idea that men’s sexual pleasure is of
utmost importance. Anti-pornography feminists want to put a stop to pornography so it
can no longer promote the idea that men can be reduced to their penises because
pornography can encourage men to think that the satisfaction of their desires is their
right, regardless o f who they have to hurt to do so.
Pro-pomography feminists are not alone in accusing those who disagree with
them about the morality of pornography of being victims of sexist thought. Antipornography feminists also accuse pro-pomography feminists of being victims of
patriarchy. Many feminists who oppose pornography say that those who promote it only
like pornography because they do not see that what they consider to be sex is actually
subordination disguised as sex by patriarchy (Cole, “Power” 42-43). They believe that
many pro-pomography feminists worry, “more about feminists telling [them] what to do
than the extent to which a bona fide sexual ideology has already laid down the rules for
[them]” (Cole, “Power” 43). Thus, pro-pomography feminists claim that antipornography feminists restrict women’s sexuality by telling them not to model their sex
life after pornography. But pro-pomography feminists do not realize how much women’s
sex lives are already shaped by the stereotypes and sexist ideas that pornography (and the
sexist culture upon which it can be based) fosters (Cole, “Power” 43).
Although there might women (and men) who, because of pornography,
unknowingly begin to believe that the subordination of women is necessarily part of sex,
there might also be many women (and men) who enjoy pornography without acquiring
sexist ideas about sex. Many women enjoy pornography without unknowingly becoming
sexist. Thus, describing any woman who defends pornography “as a brainwashed victim
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who has fallen in love with her oppression” (McElroy 94) is both incorrect and degrading
to these women. It is not true that all women who use pornography “have been
psychologically damaged by patriarchy and no longer know their own minds” (McElroy
111).

Some women who use pornography might inadvertently promote sexist
definitions of sex, but other women who use pornography enjoy their sexuality, as they
would like to define it. So, although it seems likely that many men and women learn to
enjoy the subordination o f women (Cole, “Power” 24), it is also plausible to think that
there are still some men and women who do not.
3.3 Chapter Summary
Both pro-and anti-pornography feminists are true feminists because they both
want to improve the lives of women. They both want sexual freedom for women; they
just disagree about whether pornography helps or hinders this freedom. Neither pro- nor
anti-pornography feminists work for or belong to the conservative right. Sometimes
women who enjoy pornography become victims of patriarchy by subscribing to sexist
values without realizing it, and sometimes they enjoy pornography fully informed.
Sometimes those who oppose pornography inadvertently enforce sexist gender
stereotypes and sometimes they merely point out that pornography can encourage people
to do so. As moral perception dictates, we can avoid these instances of defective
perception by looking at the particulars and immersing ourselves in the many different
situations in which pornography is used, produced, defended and argued against. This
will make feminists better able to determine when beliefs about pornography actually
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attack feminist values and will make them better able to argue against anti-feminism
rather than against each other.
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Chapter Four: Incomplete Perception
Incomplete perception is when we do not understand a situation enough to know
which particulars o f the situation require our attention. This type of blindness leaves us
misinterpreting our perceptions because we do not pay enough attention to the particulars
of a situation to correctly interpret what we see. Incomplete perception affects the
feminist pornography debate when feminists interpret certain facts as evidence of the
morality or immorality of pornography when these facts do not actually dictate morality.
There are four main facts that feminists on both sides of the pornography debate
use as evidence to support their opinions about the morality of pornography, when these
facts do not in fact dictate the morality of pornography. The first is the fact that women
purchase pornography. The second is that pornography is profitable. The third is that
there is research about the effects of pornography and the fourth is that challenging sexist
social norms is beneficial to feminism. This chapter explains how incomplete perception
allows feminists to incorrectly believe that each of these facts support their claims about
the morality of pornography. I will now examine how incomplete perception affects how
feminists perceive each of these facts, starting with the fact that women purchase
pornography.
4.1 Women Purchase Pornography
According to a Time magazine article, “in the US 40 per cent of ‘adult videos’ are
said to be purchased by women” (Segal 60), while an “Adult Video News survey reported
63 per cent o f all pornography tapes being rented by [heterosexual] couples, or women”
(Segal 60). Regardless of which figure is more accurate, many pro-pomography
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feminists argue that the fact that women purchase pornography is evidence that
pornography is morally legitimate. They believe that women purchase pornography
because they enjoy it and find that it improves their lives. So, those who promote
pornography argue that evidence of women buying pornography can be used to show that
pornography is morally right because pornography helps women enjoy their sexuality.
Conversely, many anti-pornography feminists believe that women are not buying
pornography because they enjoy it, but because they are pressured into doing so. Thus
feminists who oppose pornography argue that evidence of women buying pornography
shows that pornography is immoral because it is evidence that women are coerced into
using pornography or enabling others to do so.
Arguing that women buying pornography indicates that the morality of
pornography corresponds with the following example of incomplete perception provided
by Kukla. In some situations, it is correct to interpret women being affectionate as
signifying a sisterly relationship, but in other situations women being affectionate
signifies that these women are lovers. Similarly, when women purchase pornography
because they enjoy pornography, this can suggest that women purchasing pornography is
morally acceptable. Yet when women are coerced into purchasing pornography, the fact
that women purchase pornography suggests that women purchasing pornography is
morally unacceptable. Believing that women showing each other affection signifies that
they are sisters is either correct or incorrect depending on the situation. Looking at the
particulars of situations in which women are affectionate with each other allows us to
correctly interpret the affection that we perceive. Similarly, believing that the fact that
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women purchasing pornography signifies the immorality of pornography can be either
correct or incorrect depending on the situations in which women purchase pornography.
Many pro-pomography feminists argue that the fact that women buy pornography
shows that pornography is moral because using pornography has positive effects on
women’s lives. There are two main ways in which pro-pomography feminists argue that
pornography benefits women. The first is that pornography can teach women about sex,
and the second is that it can help women enjoy their sexuality.
4.1(a) Teaching Women About Sexuality
Feminists on both sides of the pornography debate argue that women buying
pornography indicates its morality by pointing out that pornography can teach women
about their sexuality in many different ways. Pornography can be used as a type of sex
therapy; it can teach women about sex; it can teach women about their attitudes regarding
certain sex acts; and it can inform women of their sexual options.
4.1(a)(i) Sex Therapy:
Some pro-pomography feminists argue that women buying pornography shows
that pornography is moral because pornography can be used as a type of therapy. Many
clinical psychologists recommend pornography for couples with sexual problems because
couples can use pornography to become more intimate with each other (Strossen 163).
Many sex therapists also recommend the use of pornography “as a way of opening up
communication on sex” (McElroy 140). When pornography is used as a tool to help
improve people’s sex lives and relationships by encouraging them to discuss their wants
and needs, women purchasing pornography as sex therapy can be used to show that
pornography is moral.
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However, this positive outcome is not always the result when women are
encouraged to use pornography as sex therapy. As some anti-pornography feminists
point out, instead of pornography helping couples discuss their sex life, pornography can
make matters worse for women. Pornography can encourage men to convince their
unwilling partners to perform sexual activities found in pornography. In one online poll,
15 percent o f women surveyed “felt pressured to re-enact scenes their partners had
viewed on Web sites” (Paul 148). Watching pornography in itself is something that
many women do not want to do. For example, on the Today Show, psychiatrist Dr. Gail
Saltz advised a woman who was upset about her husband’s use of pornography to watch
it with him. When the caller said that she did not want to, she was told that she could act
like the women in pornography instead of watching it with her husband. In this instance
the caller’s concerns were not addressed, she was only told how to make her husband feel
better (Paul 142-143). When using pornography as sex therapy leads to women being
pressured into doing things that they do not want to do, the fact that women buy
pornography can be used to argue that pornography is immoral.
4.1(a)(ii) Sex Education:
Using pornography as sex therapy is not the only way that pornography can help
women learn about their sexuality. Women can also learn about sex from pornography.
“[P]om provides information about women’s bodies and techniques for facilitating
female sexual pleasure, which is otherwise sadly lacking in our society” (Strossen 166).
Thus, pornography can be used to educate women about sex, which can enhance
“women’s ability to attain sexual pleasure on their own, as well as with men” (Strossen
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166). In situations where pornography teaches women about sex, the fact that women are
buying pornography can be used to argue that pornography is moral.
Unfortunately, pornography does not always teach women true things about sex.
When pornography teaches women untrue things about sex, the fact that women buy
pornography can be used to show that pornography is immoral. Pornography can teach
women that violence, power and dressing up in uncomfortable outfits are necessarily
parts of sex, when they are not. Women who learn this feel pressured to incorporate
these elements into their sex lives. This shows that pornography can be a poor teacher
because it can teach women that violence, power and other possibly negative elements
are necessarily part of sex. When women learn lessons like this from pornography, the
fact that women buy pornography to learn about sex seems to indicate that pornography
is immoral.
4.1(a)(iii) Provider o f Sexual Options:
Pornography can also show women a variety of sexual options that they may not
otherwise discover. “Pornography is one of the windows through which women glimpse
the sexual possibilities that are open to them” (McElroy 128) and it, “provides women
with a safe environment in which they can satisfy a healthy sexual curiosity” (McElroy
130). Pornography can provide those who use it with a sense of how it might feel to
participate in different sex acts. If women are unsure about whether or not they would
like to try particular sex acts, they can get a sense of what it might feel like to participate
in them while watching others engage in these acts. This can allow women to have an
idea about how they might feel, without having to try something they might not like.
This way, “[w]omen who watch pornography acquire emotional knowledge about
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themselves” (McElroy 132). In situations like these, when women are learning about
themselves and their sexual options through pornography, the fact that women buy
pornography can be used to argue that pornography is moral.
In other situations, viewing pornography to find sexual options can be used to
show the immorality of pornography. When a majority of easily accessible pornography
shows similar types of sex, women buying pornography can limit women’s sexual
options. Often the pornography that is available is geared towards a certain type of male
audience, which leaves women with few sexual options. In many stores, “[mjost of the
stuff seems predictably sexist and racist; genres include ‘Big Tits’, ‘Sodomania’, ‘Gang
Bang’, ‘Inter-racial’ (as if that in itself were pornographic), [and] ‘Raunch-o-Rama’”
(Juffer 58). When the selection of pornography is limited in this way, the fact that
women are buying pornography implies that pornography is immoral because it can limit,
not expand, women’s sexual options.
4.1(b) Improving Sex Lives
Secondly, many pro-pomography feminists argue that pornography is moral
because women who buy pornography find it sexually exciting. This allows women to
use pornography to make their sex lives more enjoyable. Thus, pornography can not only
teach women about their sexuality, but pornography can help women enjoy their
sexuality as well. Pornography can help women enjoy their sexuality in two main ways:
it can be arousing and it can make people feel more comfortable with their sexual desires.
4.1(b)(i) Sexual Stimulus:
Women often enjoy pornography. One woman describes: “as I turned the pages
to view one exquisite female creature after another, a funny thing began to happen: I got
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excited” (Sheiner 36). Another woman says that she became “an avid enjoyer of
pornography simply by actually looking at” it (Strossen 143). In situations like these,
when women are buying pornography because they find it arousing, the fact that women
are buying pornography seems to indicate that pornography is moral because it helps
women enjoy their sexuality.
But, this is not the case for all women who buy pornography. Some women buy
pornography because if they do not, they will be left out of social groups. If women
decide not to use pornography they can lose friends, boyfriends, husbands, and lovers
because many people believe that, “a woman who doesn’t like pornography is either
prudish or judgemental” (Paul 134). Women who do not like pornography can be
pressured into buying it to please others and to avoid stigma. As one woman explains,
“it’s better for women not to complain. ‘Guys think it’s really uncool for a woman to get
pissed off about it’” (Paul 126).
Relationships are not the only things that can be affected by women’s attitudes
about pornography; careers can also suffer. At one hospital in Texas it is customary for
the doctors to go to strip clubs after work. In an attempt to avoid being sexist, all of the
women are invited to go. These women understand that if they do not go along, they may
not be well liked by their co-workers and will find it harder, if not impossible, to get
promoted (Paul 18).
Ariel Levy explains another way in which society can pressure women into
buying pornography. She argues that one reason why so many women purchase
pornography is because acting like a ‘girl’ is looked down upon, so for women to earn
respect they must enjoy pornography to become ‘one of the guys.’ Many women want
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the status that comes along with being considered ‘one of the guys’ because if they do
they are allowed into exclusive groups of men with power and they avoid the stigma of
being labelled a ‘girl’. In Levy’s words, women:
Want to be like men, and profess to disdain women who are overly
focused on the appearance of femininity. But men seem to like those
women, those girly-girls, or like to look at them, at least. So to really be
like men, [they] have to enjoy looking at those women too. (99)

When women purchase pornography to become ‘one of the guys’, the fact that women
buy pornography suggests that pornography is immoral. This is because when women
want to become ‘one of the guys’ in this way, they devalue all things that society labels
as feminine, which leaves women, even the ones who do try to act like men, subordinate
to men.
Not all women purchase pornography to become ‘one of the guys’. Many women
buy pornography to criticise the women in it. When women buy pornography to rate the
attractiveness of other women, the fact that women purchase pornography adds to the
immorality o f the situation because women are purchasing pornography to participate in
sexism. Some women keep stacks of men’s magazines to rate the attractiveness of the
women in them. As observed by Levy, while looking at the images in these magazines,
these women make comments such as “Oh, she looks good, or check out that ass.. .This is
so airbrushed, or Oh, her tits are fake” (100). Women using pornography to criticise
women is another way in which the fact that women purchase pornography appears to
show that pornography is immoral.
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4.1(b)(ii) Validating Sexual Desires:
Pornography can help women enjoy their sexuality by validating their desires
(Strossen 165). When women use pornography that depicts other people who have
fantasies similar to their own, they feel as though their desires are healthy because these
desires are what others want as well. In other words, pornography can strip away sexual
guilt (McElroy 139) and can, “help people feel more at ease with their own sexuality”
(Carol 23). When women feel at ease with their sexuality, they can enjoy sex more easily
because they no longer have negative feelings associated with their sexual desires.
Unfortunately, pornography can also lead to women invalidating their sexual
desires. When women see other women in pornography being aroused by things that
they themselves do not find arousing, they may begin to believe that there is something
wrong with their sexual desires. This belief can leave women feeling ashamed of or
uncomfortable with their own desires. Thus pornography can make women’s sex lives
worse because it can teach them to be uncomfortable with their own desires.
Not only can pornography teach women to invalidate their sexual desires, it can
teach women to ignore them all together. When pornography depicts women in the
service of men, or women whose only desire is pleasing men, women may learn that their
desires do not matter. Some pornography can show that women enjoying sex at all is
undesirable. For example in one pornographic film following a sex scene with two men
and a woman named Claire, “[ajfter both men spank her reddened buttocks, one asks,
‘Are you crying?’ Claire answers, ‘No, I’m enjoying it,’ to which the man replies,
‘Damn, I thought you were crying. It was turning me on when I thought you were
crying.’ Claire asks if he would prefer her to cry and he responds, ‘Yes, give me a
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fucking tear’ ” (Paul 121-122). When pornography teaches women to devalue their
desires, the fact that women purchase pornography suggests that pornography is immoral.
4.1(c) Women Purchase Pornography Summary
Pornography has authority (Strossen 175). So the fact that women are buying
pornography can be used to argue that pornography is moral, or that is it immoral,
depending on the situation. Feminists on both sides of the pornography debate have been
trying to convince those on the other side that their interpretation of this fact is correct,
instead of realizing that either interpretation can be correct, depending on the situation.
When we look at the particulars of the situation, as moral perception theory dictates, we
see that some women are coerced into buying pornography, while other women enjoy it.
We also see that some women’s sex lives are made better with the use of pornography,
while others’ are made worse. To stop incomplete perception from allowing us to believe
that the fact the women buy pornography dictates the morality of it, we must look at the
particulars of the situations in which women purchase pornography to understand if the
purchase of pornography adds to the morality or immorality of the situation. If we
immerse ourselves in the situations in which women purchase pornography, we can avoid
this instance of incomplete perception and learn to correctly interpret when the fact that
women purchase pornography adds to the morality or immorality of the situation.
4.2 Pornography is Profitable
Incomplete perception leads feminists on both sides of the pornography debate to
believe that the fact that women in the sex industry earn money is evidence of the
morality of pornography. Many pro-pornography feminists believe that pornography
must be morally right because the money that those who perform in it earn from their
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work affords these women independence. Yet, many anti-pornography feminists argue
that sex workers must be coerced into their work because the money that they earn is
more like compensation for abuse than a pay cheque. Thus, feminists on both sides of
this debate believe that the role of money in pornography proves their views about
pornography to be correct, when it only demonstrates that there are different situations
within which pay for sex work is received.
This type of moral perception corresponds with Kukla’s example of incomplete
perception: In some situations women showing affection can signify that they are sisters,
while in other situations it can signify that they are lovers. Also, in some situations the
fact that women are paid to participate in the making of pornography can signify that
pornography is moral; while in other situations it can signify that pornography is
immoral.
4.2(a) Morality in the Profitability o f Pornography
As we know, money is a necessity in our society. It is needed to acquire virtually
all things necessary to fulfill our basic needs. Because women (as well as everyone else)
cannot have much in the way of freedom or power without money, any job that pays
enough for someone to afford what they need and want is empowering because it literally
gives people power to purchase what they like. Thus many pro-pornography feminists
argue that pornography is moral because it can allow women to earn money, which gives
them the ability to do what they want.
Many sex workers discuss how their work provides them with enough money to
pursue more than comfortable lifestyles, which include large houses, beautiful clothing,
expensive cars and world travel. One woman found that the money she earned as a
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stripper affected her life in many positive ways. In her words, “Without having stripped,
I’d now be leading a different life. I’d own no stereo system, TV, microwave, car,
diploma, scores o f appliances, expensive art, nor two closets overflowing with beautiful
clothes and shoes. I’d never have seen Canada, Mexico, Central America, the Northeast,
the Pacific, France, Holland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy, Switzerland, nor
Great Britain” (Reed 187-188).
Money can do more than buy expensive things to make life more enjoyable, it can
also help women empower themselves in other ways. For example, money can help
women leave abusive situations. Without money some women who are, “dead broke and
have children to support and care for.. .might have no option but to stay in an abusive
situation, especially if all the shelters are full” (Monet 219). One woman found that her
high income from prostitution improved all aspects of her life:
With her money, she paid for dinners, designed and built a house (more of
a mansion, really).. .[went] to Calistoga in her Mercedes for a romantic
and pampered weekend, and she even hired a private detective to
investigate the local police when they were trying to bust her.. .The
dynamics between her and her husband were even different.. .she was the
‘primary wage earner’, so she wasn’t financially dependent on him. The
confidence o f knowing she could support herself, support a family, even
defend herself against the police if need be, permeated every life choice
she made. (Monet 218-219)

Thus the money earned from sex work can also help women escape from abusive
situations and empower themselves.
Many pro-pornography feminists argue that pornography must be moral because
the money earned from sex work can give women the ability to live lives that they find
both enjoyable and empowering. But, this argument does not prove that pornography is
moral because although it is important for people to have the means to lead fulfilling
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lives, it does not follow that anything that provides these means is moral. For example, if
someone were to become an assassin or a thief to make enough money to improve her
life, it would not make murder or theft moral occupations.
Another reason why paying sex workers does not make sex work a moral
occupation is because many sex workers argue that money is poor motivation for sex
work. Many pro-pornography feminists argue that women who enter into the sex
industry because they want to make money are the ones most likely to do things with
which they are not comfortable. This is because many women who decide to perform in
pornography only for the money will not enjoy their work and are thus more likely to feel
as though money is more compensation for the use of their bodies than payment for their
work. Nina Hartley, a stripper, pornography actor and pornographer, explains: “I feel
bad for women who get into pornography not for the fun, but because they seek only
economic gain.. .because they are the ones who will be hurt by the experience. They will
feel exploited, used, and abused” (McElroy 160).
Many women improve their lives and empower themselves with the money that
they earn from sex work. Yet, immoral acts, such as theft and murder, do not become
moral if those who perform them lead better lives because of the money earned from
these acts. Also, entering the sex industry to make money often leads to feelings of abuse
and exploitation. Thus, the fact that sex work can allow women to make enough money
to lead better lives does not prove that sex work is moral.
4.2(b) Immorality in the Profitability o f Pornography
The fact that sex work can be profitable for women also does not mean that sex
work is immoral. Anti-pornography feminists tend to argue that the fact that sex workers
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get paid for their work proves that pornography is immoral for three main reasons. The
first reason is that no women want to participate in the making of pornography, so the
money that they earn from sex work is compensation for doing what they do not want to
do and not mere payment for their labour. The second reason is that even women who
enjoy sex work have days when they do not want to go to work, just like people
employed in other types of work. So, when women decide to go to work when they do
not want to, they are coerced into sex work because they do not really want to do their
jobs; they just work because they do not want to be fired. The third reason is that when
profitability is the focus o f producing pornography, respect for women is seen as second
to making money and is often ignored in order to make pornography more profitable.
4.2(b)(i) Women Do Not Like Sex Work:
Many anti-pornography feminists argue that no one really wants to do sex work,
so the money that women make from sex work must be a form of coercion that makes
women become and continue to be sex workers. These feminists argue that women in the
pornography industry must be coerced into sex work because the work is so degrading
that no one would enjoy it. As one anti-pornography feminist describes:
Women in the pornography industry are totally depraved, capitulating to a
sexual frenzy brought on by the manipulations of a masterful male. It is
an image o f women possessed, at once by her uncontrollable sexual urges
and by the men who can exploit them.. Just the fact that women pose for
them is proof of our depravity. (Cole, “Power” 55)

Thus many feminists who oppose pornography believe that the money earned from
pornography makes pornography immoral because it convinces women to degrade
themselves. To support this argument, many anti-pornography feminists point out that
“women who work in the industry do so mostly because of economic options” (Cole,
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“Power” 56) because they have no other way to make the money they need. Many antipornography feminists point out that “needing money for basic needs and for drugs has
been associated with such sexual exploitation. Children on the streets often engage in
what is termed ‘survival sex,’ to pay for food, shelter and other necessities. Survival sex
is the sale of sexual services by those such as homeless youth and women in poverty who
have few other options” (Tutty 33).
Although many women find sex work degrading and disempowering, if we learn
more about the relationship between money and pornography, as moral perception
requires, we will see that this is not always the case. The idea that all women do not want
to be sex workers, but are coerced into doing so because of the money that can be made
from it, is simply not true for many sex workers. There are sex workers who like their
jobs. Just to name a few, Norma Jean Almodovar says: “I discovered that I really liked
‘whoring’, I felt an immense sense of relief and liberation” (214); Cosi Fabian is, “proud
- and happy - to be called ‘whore’” (53); Marcy Sheiner says: “Sex work is something I
drifted into, and when I learned that I could not only earn money at it but also enjoy it
immensely, I continued” (36); and Siobhan Brooks says, “I do feel free dancing,
exploring my erotic side” (255). The experiences of these women, and many others, show
that it is not always correct to conclude that women do not want to work in the sex
industry.
4.2(b)(ii) Assaulted or Fired:
The second reason why many anti-pornography feminists believe that the
involvement of money in pornography makes it immoral is that even sex workers who
enjoy their work are bound to have days when they do not feel like working, just like any
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other employee. When these women have such days they cannot decide not to work
because if they do not work, they will be fired. When they end up going to work despite
disinclination, their work becomes sexual assault because they are forced to perform
sexual activities that they do not want to perform. Although many women in the sex
industry experience this problem, it does not accurately describe the effect of money on
sex work for all women in the industry.
Some sex workers believe that their work is equivalent to any other job. They
treat their job just like any other, so for these women, when there are days when they
work reluctantly, it is not sexual assault, just another day on the job. As one woman
explains, “[w]e saw prostitution as sex work. It was just work like any other kind of
work” (MacCowan 233). Women who experience their sex work this way are no more
assaulted when required to perform sex acts although they do not particularly feel like it,
than any other employees are when they go to work reluctantly.
It is not that sex work either is or is not different from other types of work. It is
that sex work is either the same as, or different from, other types of work, depending of
the particulars o f the situation in which sex work is performed. Some women believe that
it “is anti-sex sentiment, or erotophobia, that leads to such a strong distinction between
sex work and many other types of work available to women on the bottom rungs of the
economic ladder” (Highleyman 148). Yet, other women believe that sex work is
different than all other types of work in our society and it is wrong to pretend that it is the
same (Cole, “Power” 102). Some women do find sex work to be different from other
types of work, and others do not. Neither of these experiences is more correct or
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incorrect than the other; they are two equally valid explanations of the different ways in
which women experience sex work.
Not only can sex workers have days when they do not feel the desire to go to
work, but sex workers can also be coerced, through money, to perform certain sex acts
that they do not want to perform. This often happens when women have already
performed in many pornographic films and need to expand what they are willing to do in
order to continue their employment. “Jonathan Morgan, a ‘performer turned
director’. . .explains it as follows:
The girls could be graded like A, B, and C. The A is the chick on the
boxcover.. .Here you have a borderline A/B doing a double anal.
Directors will remember that. She’ll get phone calls. For a double anal
you’d usually expect a B or C. They have to do the dirty stuff or they
won’t get a phone call. You’ve had a kid, you’ve got some stretchmarks you’re up there doing double anal. Some girls are used up in nine months
or a year. An 18-year-old, sweet young thing, signs with an agency,
makes five films in her first week. Five directors, five actors, five times
five: she gets phone calls. A hundred movies in four months. She’s not a
fresh face anymore. Her price slips and she stops getting phone calls.
Then it’s, ‘Okay, will you do anal? Will you do gang-bangs?’ Then
they’re used u p .. .The market forces of this industry use them up.
(Whisnant 17)
These examples show that in some situations money is used to coerce women into
performing sex acts that they do not want to perform.
But, sex workers are not always forced to engage in sexual labour when they do
not want to because some sex workers have agency in their jobs. Some can refuse to
serve customers that they do not like. At one peepshow theatre the management allows
“dancers the authority to have someone removed from the theatre for any reason”
(Dudash 101). The dancers also have the option to “simply shut the curtain before the
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time has run out” (Dudash 102). When sex workers have these options, they may not be
forced to perform sex acts when they do not want to.
Also, it is not true that all sex workers are forced to work when they do not want
to because some sex workers have the option to stop or take a break from their work if
they feel the need. When sex workers find that they are no longer enjoying their work,
they may be able to take a break from it. Many sex workers do feel the need to take
breaks from their jobs. Sex worker Annie Sprinkle calls this Sex Worker Burnout
Syndrome (SWBS). According to Sprinkle, almost all sex workers who freely choose
their work experience this syndrome at some point in their careers (67). Often when sex
workers recognise that they have SWBS they have the option to take time off or to pursue
other career options. Usually, time off work cures this syndrome (Sprinkle 67-68).
Some sex workers have the ability to decide when and how they work, so not all
sex workers are sexually assaulted in or by their work. This does not mean that all
women who work in the pornography industry have the option to choose when and for
whom they work. There are many sex workers who do not have these options. The
variety of different situations within which women are paid for sex work shows that the
fact that women earn a wage for sex work does not dictate the morality of pornography.
The details of the situation within which sex workers are paid for their work dictate the
moral effects of the money involved.
4.2(b)(iii) Money as More Important than Women:
A third reason why people believe that the involvement of money in the
pornography industry makes it immoral is because when making a profit is a priority, the
wellbeing o f women is often not. This encourages pomographers to do whatever makes
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the most money, which does not usually include allowing sex worker agency. As one
woman put it: “In their more honest moments, [pomographers] readily admit that what is
at stake for them in the pornography debate is their profitability” (Cornell 554-555).
However, some pomographers’ desire for profit leads to valuing women more.
There are pomographers who ensure that their workers are comfortable with the sex acts
that they perform. Some pomographers interview women about what they enjoy doing
and only cast them for the roles that they say they will enjoy (McElroy 6). These
pomographers believe that making their employees comfortable leads to higher profits.
According to John Stagliano, owner of the pornographic film company Evil Angel,
“[ojnly if a woman enjoys what she’s doing.. .can she give a convincing performance”
(McElroy 6). He believes that pornography is more profitable when performances are
believable, which can only be achieved when women truly enjoy sex work. So, for him,
the desire to make money leads to ensuring that sex workers are not coerced into
performing sex acts that they do not want to perform.
There are also feminist pomographers who care about the women they work with
and do their best to ensure that they are comfortable with their work. For example,
Candida Royalle of Femme Productions comforts her employees if they appear to be
uncomfortable with their sex work (544).
Although many sex workers do enjoy their work, many women in pornography
are abused, exploited and, “manipulated into performing sex acts to which they have not
agreed” (McElroy 6). Thus, some sex workers have agency in their jobs and need no one
to stop their employers from mistreating them, while other sex workers have no such
agency and need help when they are coerced and abused.
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4.2(c) Profitability o f Pornography Summary
In using moral perception to correct this instance of incomplete perception by
looking at the details of how different sex workers view their pay (i.e. either as
compensation for abuse, a form of coercion, a bonus of finding enjoyable work, or just
fair pay for services rendered), we see that the involvement of money in the production of
pornography does not dictate its morality. Looking deeper into the different situations in
which sex workers receive payment for their work allows us to see that discussions about
money in the pornography industry should not be about whether pro- or anti-pornography
feminists are right about the effect of money on pornography. If money is used as a form
of coercion then money as part of sex work adds to the immorality of the situation. On
the other hand, if someone enjoys sex work and sees the money earned from it as
payment for a job well done, then the earnings of these sex workers adds to the morality
of the situation. Once we immerse ourselves in the different situations in which
pornography is produced, we can recognize the various ways in which money is involved
in pornography and can correct incomplete perception about the affects of money on the
morality of pornography.
4.3 Pornography Research
Research about pornography produces a series of facts about whether
pornography causes sexism and violence against women. However, these facts have no
necessary moral implications about pornography in general. Many researchers have and
continue to investigate the effects of pornography on those who use it and there appear to
be as many findings indicating that pornography does have these negative effects as those
that have found the opposite. These different findings prompt many feminists on both
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sides of the pornography debate to argue over which of these apparently conflicting
results are correct. When these feminists participate in incomplete perception they
believe that this research proves whether pornography is moral or immoral. They tend
not to see the particulars of pornography research in enough detail to tell the difference
between situations in which pornography creates and perpetuates sexism and those in
which it does not.
This type o f moral blindness - i.e. feminists arguing that research about
pornography proves the morality of pornography - corresponds with Kukla’s example of
incomplete perception. Women showing affection can signify different types of
relationships depending on the particulars of the situation. Similarly, research on the
morality of pornography can suggest that pornography is either moral or immoral
depending on the particulars of the research. So, just as believing that women showing
affection signifies only one type of relationship is an instance of incomplete perception,
so is believing that research about pornography leads to only one conclusion about the
morality of pornography.
There are two main ways in which feminists who promote pornography tend to
claim that pornography does not cause sexism and two main ways in which feminists
who oppose pornography counter these claims. The first claim that pro-pornography
feminists tend to make is that no correlation can be found between pornography and
sexism, while anti-pornography feminists argue that pornography creates sexism. The
second claim that feminists who support the use of pornography tend to make is that
pornography does not cause sexism because the opposite is true: sexism causes
pornography. In response to this, many feminists who oppose the use of pornography
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argue that pornography validates sexist thought and actions, which convinces those who
have sexist desires to act upon them. I will now look at the first set of the arguments
presented by pro- and anti- pornography feminists: that there is no correlation between
pornography and sexism on the one side, and that pornography leads to sexism and
violence against women on the other.
4.3(a) The Correlation Between Pornography and Sexism
Many pro-pornography feminists argue that pornography does not have anything
to do with sexism. There are three main ways in which this point is argued. The first is
to argue that pornography does not affect people’s attitudes toward women and sex; the
second is to argue that factors other than pornography cause sexism, so pornography is
not to blame; and the third is to say that because there has been pornography without
sexism and vice versa, pornography cannot be the cause of sexism. As moral perception
requires, I will look at each of these arguments in detail.
4.3(a)(i) Pornography Does Not Affect Attitudes:
Pro-pornography feminists tend to argue that research shows that pornography
does not affect people’s attitudes and actions towards women and sex, so pornography
cannot be the cause o f sexism. As one woman claims, “[a]ll evidence shows that
children’s basic sexuality is established early in life and will not suddenly be changed by
later exposure to sexual materials” (Carol 23). Many studies appear to support this claim.
For example, one study shows that “initially disliked stimuli tend to become even more
disliked with greater exposure whereas such exposure produces more positive and
favourable attitudes toward stimuli that are initially pleasing” (Nelson 174). This finding
suggests that pornography will not change people’s attitudes about women and sex
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because pornography will only reinforce desires that are already held and thus not
convince people to start enjoying sexism and violence against women, if they did not
already do so.
Although using pornography does not affect some people’s attitudes about women
and sex, others find that pornography does affect these attitudes. Many people find that
their sexual desires are affected by viewing pornography. One man, as quoted by Pamela
Paul, explains how pornography has changed his attitudes towards women: “I find that I
look more for women who have the attributes that I see in pom. I want bigger breasts,
blonder hair, curvier bodies in general.. .1 find that when I’m out at a party or a bar, I
catch myself sizing up women” (81). Another man “encouraged all his ex-wives and
girlfriends to watch pomos with him so they could see what turned him on. ‘If I were
with a woman and I weren’t getting the kind of pleasure I see people enjoying in pom
films, then I wouldn’t be with that woman,’ he says. ‘I’ve broken up with women who
wouldn’t perform certain things I’ve seen in adult films.’ For example, if a woman isn’t
into oral sex the way porno stars are - enjoying the act, the swallowing, the cum shots on
her body - then [he] isn’t into her” (Paul 93). Pornography does affect the way these
men view women and sex because they want women and sex to be like what they see in
pornography.
Just as many feminists argue that pornography affects people’s views about
women and sex, many feminists also believe that pornography can encourage people to
enjoy and partake in violence against women. Many studies show that there is no link
between pornography and violence against women. For example, one study looked at
how viewing pornography affected attitudes about women, sexism, rape myth
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acceptance, acceptance of interpersonal violence, gender stereotypes, and emotionality.
In this study, 100 men and 100 women aged 18-30 were divided into two groups. One
group was shown pornography and the other was not. The results of this study, “suggest
that, for the average consumer of popular hardcore pornography aged 18-30, the
commonly-feared adverse effects of pornography are non-existent or, at worst, minimal”
(Martin). Yet, many studies show the opposite. “In one study, male subjects were asked
to participate in a (mock) rape trial after viewing violent pornography. They failed to see
the seriousness of a woman’s real rape, and they gave a significantly shorter sentence to
the rapist than did men who had not seen the films” (Cole, “Pornography” 50-51).
The different results of these studies show that pornography can change people’s
desires and attitudes about women, sex about violence, but it does not always do so. This
suggests that it is neither universally true nor universally false that pornography causes
sexism, but that we must learn to tell the difference between the situations in which
pornography does cause sexism and those in which it does not. If we immerse ourselves
in the situations in which pornography is used and studied we can mitigate this instance
of incomplete perception and see these situations in enough detail to understand when
pornography does and when pornography does not cause sexism.
4.3(a)(ii) The Cause o f Sexism:
Some pro-pornography feminists argue that something other than pornography
causes sexism, so pornography cannot be to blame. The state and the church are often
considered to be the cause of sexism because some traditional values enforced by many
religions and governments include the same sexist beliefs that can be found in
pornography. Thus it has been argued that these institutions are to blame for sexism and
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violence against women, so pornography is not. As one pro-pornography feminist
explains: “The question is, why should what has historically been a widely acceptable
view - women as the sexual property of men - be blamed on a marginal genre like
pornography, when respectable institutions like the church and the state have promoted
those same values unhindered for thousands of years” (Carol 5)? Some argue that when
we look at how many sexist values major religions uphold, “we begin to see what might
be behind the real causes of rape: conservative, repressive sexual attitudes that emanate
not from pornography, but from religious sources” (Carol 72).
Yet, as many anti-pornography feminists point out, sometimes it looks as though
pornography is to blame for sexist beliefs and actions. One woman explains how her
husband learned sexual violence from pornography:
When we were first married, he didn’t use pornography or drink. Later he
started to drink, and, after he started using pornography, sex became
especially abusive. He got ideas from the pornography. Having sex, how
he wanted it, was nonnegotiable. (Wilhem 46)
In this example, pornography did lead to violence. Thus, in some situations pornography
is the cause of sexism, while in other situations other factors, such as religion and the
state, are to blame. When we look at the particulars of the situations in which
pornography is used and studied, we can mitigate this instance of incomplete perception
and leam to tell the difference between situations in which pornography causes sexism
and those in which another factor is to blame.
4.3(a)(iii) Sexism With and Without Pornography:
A third way pro-pornography feminists tend to argue that pornography does not
cause sexism is to point out that there is sexism without pornography, and pornography
without sexism. This leads many to argue that pornography cannot cause sexism because
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there can be one without the other. As one woman explains, “[w]e can document the
existence of societies that had sexism without pornography” (Carol 49). For example, “in
India, a country that severely restricts sexually explicit material, violence against women
is at epidemic proportions” (Procida 98). Not only are there places where there is no or
little pornography and a lot of violence against women, there are also places where there
is pornography, yet the lives of women do not seem to be negatively affected. For
example, “in Europe, studies of crime rates in nations which have recently legalized
pornography have not shown an increase in sex-related crimes” (Procida 98).
The fact that sexism and pornography exist independently of each other does not
prove that pornography does not cause sexism. To make this point clear, I will use a
canonical example: there can be death without poisoning (e.g. when someone dies of
natural causes) and poisoning without death (e.g. if someone becomes ill because they
were poisoned, but does not die), but this does not mean that poison does not cause death.
Yet, as many pro-pornography feminists point out, it is not just that there is
pornography without sexism and vice versa, but it appears as though there are more
women’s rights when there is pornography. After all, it is true that, “at no time in history
has women’s position been better than it has become in the west during the same period
that pornography has been widely available” (Carol 49). This still does not prove that
pornography does not cause sexism because pornography may hinder women’s rights,
even though it is widely available in places where women have many rights. This is
because some people can promote women’s rights, while others promote sexism through
pornography. So the fact that western culture tends to include both women’s right and
pornography does not prove that pornography does not cause sexism because those who
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promote women’s rights and those who attack them with pornography can co-exist in
western society.
In order to show that pornography can cause sexism, many anti-pornography
feminists claim that pornography teaches people to believe that sexism is normal, so they
learn to behave in sexist ways because of the pornography they consume. As one woman
who was raped by her boyfriend explains: “He went to this party, saw pornography, got
an erection, then inflicted his erection on me. There is a direct causal relationship here”
(Russell, “Testimony” 50). Yet as many pro-pornography feminists point out,
pornography does not appear to cause anti-pornography feminists to behave in sexist
ways. As one pro-pornography feminist explains, “[ajlthough anti-pom feminists cry out
against viewing pornography, they must admit that there is at least one group of people
who can survive such exposure without harm - namely, themselves” (McElroy 103).
Feminist views about sex can prevent people from being persuaded by the sexism
that pornography can promote. Thus it may be the feminist views of those who oppose
pornography that protects them from learning sexism from the pornography that they see.
Others are protected from the sexism that pornography can teach in other ways. Some
people see pornography as only a depiction of their sexual fantasies and have no problem
differentiating between treating pornography as an object, and women as people. One
man describes how easily he makes this distinction: “The difference between real women
and the women in pornography are crystal clear to him: ‘In pom, the women are objects
and I see them that way. But if I met those women in real life I wouldn’t see them like
that’ ” (Paul 79). Yet, when others use pornography they leam to stereotype women and
men. They also leam that the subordination of women is normal. As one man explains:
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I had been fed thousands of pages of.. .jokes and cartoons on how to treat
women, what they REALLY liked. I was really dealing with pictures,
zillions o f breasts, buttocks, fantasies of oral sex - very big in the sixties,
before violence became more explicit. I expected long drawn-out multiple
orgasms with women babbling deliriously, thanking you as they fainted or
died in blissful exhaustion. Primed by the stuff, I actually assaulted the
first woman I took to a prom, feeling absolutely entitled to her putting out.
(Duffesne 107-108)
Thus, although “feminists have pointed out that rape existed long before Playboy
appeared in the racks of comer stores” (McElroy 44), the fact that violence against
women existed before pornography does not mean that pornography is not the cause of
sexism and violence against women today. In other words, pornography can be a
sufficient, not a necessary, cause of sexism.
4.3(b) Is Pornography the Cause or Product o f Sexism?
In another attempt to show that studies prove that pornography does not cause
sexism, many pro-pornography feminists argue that pornography does not cause sexism,
but the other way around: that sexism that causes pornography. Many pro-pomography
feminists argue that it is sexism that causes sexist pornography. In response to this
argument, many anti-pornography feminists argue that pornography causes sexism even
thought it many not be the initial cause of it. I will first examine how many feminists
who promote the use of pornography believe that pornography cannot cause sexism
because sexism causes pornography. I will then explain why many feminists who oppose
the use of pornography believe that pornography causes sexism, regardless of whether
sexism causes pornography.
4.3(b)(i) Sexism Came First:
Many pro-pomography feminists argue that sexist pornography does not cause
sexism, but that the opposite is true. They argue that, “[t]he sets of ideas that encourage
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men to believe that they have a right to dominate women in all areas of life, and
specifically to have rights to harass and molest us sexually, didn’t initially come from
pornography. It is the other way round” (Feminists Against Censorship 43). In other
words, “[i]t is not pornography itself that lies at the heart of women’s
oppression.. .Pornography may mirror the sexism of society but did not create it”
(Feminists Against Censorship 67).
It may be true that sexist pornography often mirrors the sexism of the society in
which it is produced, but this does not mean that pornography does not cause sexism.
4.3(b)(ii) Backlash and Perpetuation:
Many anti-pornography feminists argue that even though pornography was
originally caused by sexism, pornography perpetuates sexism today. In much of Western
culture it is no longer socially acceptable to be sexist. So, pornography is what allows
people to believe that sexism is acceptable once again by providing a new way to devalue
women4. Feminist movements have made the traditional ways of promoting sexist
beliefs (e.g. through the state and through religion) less effective, so pornography can be
seen as a form of backlash against the rights and freedoms that women have gained.
Diana Russell argues that pornography is a new way of promoting sexism and
thus causes harm in two main ways. The first is that pornography can teach people to
enjoy sexism and violence against women. The second way applies to people who have
sexist desires, but do not act upon them for two reasons: either because they believe that
it is immoral to act upon these desires or because they believe that they will be socially
sanctioned if they act upon these desires. People think that it is immoral to have and act
4 This new way (i.e. pornography) can also mask sexism. Sexism in pornography may be more difficult to
identify because pornography can practice sexism without explicitly making sexist statements, the sexism
that can be found in pornography may not be easily identifiable.
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upon sexist beliefs because in western culture it is now rarely socially acceptable to
openly state sexist beliefs. Social pressures against sexism can stop people who have
sexist desires from acting upon them because they know that there are social sanctions
against it. But, when these people use pornography, they may leam that sexism is both
acceptable and enjoyable. This can erode the social and internal pressure that stops them
from hurting women. As Russell explains, “in order for a rape to occur, a man must not
only be predisposed to rape, but his internal and social inhibitions against acting out his
rape desires must be undermined” (“Against” 119). So, pornography can cause sexism
and violence against women in two ways. Pornography, “undermines some males’
internal inhibitions against acting out their desire to rape” and it, “undermines some
males’ social inhibitions against acting out their desire to rape” (Russell, “Against” 119).
4.3(c) Pornography Research Summary
Research into the cause of sexism presents us with apparently conflicting
information. Some research seems to prove that pornography causes sexism, and other
research seems to prove it does not. Many essays explain how pornography causes
sexism, while others explain that it is the product of sexism. Some research shows that
other factors cause sexism, while other research shows that pornography is to blame.
Some studies indicate that people may be exposed to pornography without engaging in
sexist behaviours, and others indicate that sexism can exist independently of
pornography.
Moral perception theory provides the framework through which we can reconcile
all of this conflicting information. Moral perception theory tells us that we need not
decide which o f these arguments and studies are valid and which are spurious in order to
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determine the morality of pornography. Instead, we must look at the details of the
situations in which sexism and violence against women exist to find out if pornography
was the cause of these ideas and behaviours, or if other factors were to blame. Once we
recognise that there is more than one cause of sexism and violence against women
(Russell, “Against” 119), we see that in some situations pornography causes sexism and
violence against women, but sometimes it does not. Sometimes people’s views are not
changed by pornography and sometimes they are. Sometimes pornography causes
sexism, and sometimes sexism causes pornography. We must look at the particulars of
the situation to understand when pornography causes sexism and when other factors are
to blame.
4.3(c)(i) Violence and Blame:
The recognition that there is more than one cause of sexism and violence against
women can help resolve another debate over pornography amongst feminists. Many propomography feminists argue that if we believe that pornography causes violence against
women, people who do assault women will not have to pay for their crimes because they
will be able to blame pornography and thus not be responsible for their own actions. This
reasoning leaves people fearing that anti-pornography “feminists are handing a
‘pornography made me do it’ excuse to rapists” (McElroy 123).
Once we recognise that there is more than one cause of sexism and rape, we can
see that when pornography causes sexism and encourages people to rape, both
pornography and rapists are to blame. Much like those who drive drank are still
responsible for their actions, those who assault women because of their use of
pornography are also still to blame.
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Thus, when we look at research and testimony from both sides of the feminist
pornography debate, we see that sometimes pornography causes sexism and violence
against women, and sometimes pornography has no ill effects. We also see how there
can be more than one cause of sexism, and that we must look at the particulars of the
situation to see when pornography does or does not cause sexism and violence against
women.
4.4 Sexist Social Conventions
Another fact that feminists tend to mistakenly believe dictates the morality of
pornography is that defying sexist social norms helps feminism. Feminists on both sides
of the pornography debate use this fact to argue for the morality or immorality of
pornography. Many pro-pornography feminists argue that pornography defies sexist
social conventions, while anti-pornography feminists tend to argue that it reinforces
them. When we participate in incomplete perception we feel as though pornography
either defies or perpetuates these social conventions. When we look at the particulars of
the situations in which pornography is produced and used, we will be better able to
determine when pornography defies and when it perpetuates sexist social norms.
Many pro-pornography feminists believe that pornography calls, “traditional
institutions and assumptions of sexuality into question” (McElroy 55). As I will explain
in this section, there are two main ways in which they argue that pornography defies
sexist social norms. The first is that pornography demonstrates that sex is beneficial in
and of itself, and the second is that pornography can question traditional po wer
structures.
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Yet, many anti-pornography feminists argue that pornography reinforces rather
than challenges these norms, that the “pomographer is no rebel. He reinforces values
already prevalent in our culture” (Cole, “Power” 57). There are also two main ways in
which anti-pornography feminists argue that pornography reinforces sexist social norms.
The first is that pornography eroticizes traditional sexist gender roles and the second is
that pornography endorses traditional patriarchal notions of what sex is.
Many feminists use the fact that defying sexist social norms benefits feminism to
illustrate the morality of pornography. Their doing so corresponds with Kukla’s example
of incomplete perception. Just as women showing each other affection signifies different
types of relationships depending on the particulars of the situation, the fact that defying
sexist social norms benefits feminism can appear to signify either the morality or
immorality o f pornography depending on the particulars of the situation.
4.4(a) Pornography Promotes Sexuality
Many pro-pornography feminists argue that pornography shows that sex is
beneficial and thus breaks the traditional social notion that sex is dirty or wrong in three
main ways. Firstly, pornography can show that sexual discourse is beneficial. Secondly,
pornography can show that sex does not have to be about marriage, love, or procreation
to be beneficial. And finally, pornography can show that all sexual desires are
acceptable.
4.4(a)(i) Sexual Discourse:
Pornography can break the traditional notion that sex is something that people
should not talk about. It can do so by showing sex for its own sake, which can spark
conversation about sex and can encourage people to discuss it with their partners (and
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others) to develop a healthy, enjoyable sex life. Thus pornography does not endorse
traditional ideas about how people should avoid talking about sex because people can,
“use pornography as a way o f opening up communication on sex” (McElroy 140).
However, pornography can discourage people from talking about sex. Many
pornography users hide their activities from their partners. The fact that, “many men
consider pornography a private matter, one hidden or downplayed, necessarily creates
distance with girlfriends and wives” (Paul 155). Some men even avoid their partners as a
result of their use of pornography. As one woman explains about her relationship with an
ex-boyfriend “ ‘When he started watching [pornography] alone while I was at his place,
that spelled the end o f our relationship,’ she recalls, ‘At about the same time, he bought
me a vibrator. It was as if he were saying, ‘Here’s your toy. You don’t need me
anymore.’ I felt like it cheapened everything’ ” (Paul 146). In addition, when male users
of Internet pornography were interviewed about sex after they had started looking at
pornography online, “35 percent said real sex with a woman had become less arousing
and 20 percent admitted real sex just couldn’t compare to cybersex anymore” (Paul 153).
Thus, sometimes pornography leads to discussions about sex and shows that
talking about sex is beneficial, not something to be embarrassed about or something that
should be avoided. While in other situations, pornography can have isolating effects,
interfering with open communication. And, in some instances the use of pornography
encourages men to lie about and hide their pornography use from their partners, which
can distance men from real women and real sex (Paul 152)5.

5 Women may also hide their pornography use from their partners, but I have found no research suggesting
that this occurs.
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4.4(a)(ii) Sex as Beneficial:
Pornography can also question the traditional idea that sex is unacceptable in and
of itself by demonstrating that sex can be beneficial on its own. Traditionally people are
told that sex is only acceptable between straight married couples for the purpose of
procreation. Pornography can liberate women by defying these norms because it shows
sex between people outside of this traditional realm of acceptability. In the words of
Ellen Willis, as quoted by Nadine Strossen:
If social convention, backed by religion and law, confines sexuality to the
heterosexual, monogamous, marital, familial, and reproductive, then the
ambisexual, promiscuous, adulterous, selfish, and gratification-centered
world of pornography is a charter of sexual revolution that is potentially
liberating rather than confining for women. (Strossen 174)

In depicting these social norms being broken, pornography can, “rock the conventional
view of sex [and] snap the traditional ties between sex and marriage, sex and
motherhood” (McElroy 128).
But, this can also have negative effects on the sex lives of women because
pornography can make it seem as though marriage, love and sex do not go together. One
woman talks about how once her husband started using pornography, he would no longer
want to have sex with her because he did not think of her Tike that’, meaning that he
thought of her as his wife that he loves and not as someone he wanted to have sex with
(Paul 135). Another possible problem that can arise from the fact that pornography does
not often take procreation into account is that it can give the impression that safe sex is
not important. This can be seen in the fact that most pomographers do not want condoms
on their sets and pom actors do not use often them (McElroy 173).
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4.4(a)(iii) Accepting Sexual Desires:
The third way in which pornography can question the traditional notion that sex is
dirty or wrong is that it can promote a diversity of sexual desires. Pro-pomography
feminists tend to argue that pornography goes against sexist social norms by exploring
unconventional ideas about what sex is and what sex can be. Pornography can tell people
that they should not be ashamed of or deny their sexual desires, so they can be free to do
whatever they like without stigma. Traditionally, certain sex acts are considered
immoral. Women are often told to be, “ashamed of their appetites and urges.
Pornography tells them to accept and enjoy them.. .Videos make no comment on which
sexual preferences are acceptable.. .no sexual question is wrong to ask; no sexual
preference is wrong to pursue. Pornography is the true arena o f tolerance” (McElroy
139). In these situations pornography appears to defy convention by showing that all
sexual preferences should be explored and accepted, and that no one should have to deny
their sexuality merely because their desires differ from what the majority of society
considers acceptable.
But, this promotion of all sexual desires can have negative effects on the lives of
women because it can make sexism appear appropriate and acceptable. The
pomographer can be “the absolver of the fantasizer’s guilt as he informs his consumer
that the desire to violate women is not only acceptable but has its own rewards.. .he is our
culture’s most effective propagandist” (Cole, “Power” 57).
So, sometimes it appears moral that pornography tells us that all sex is acceptable
because it allows us to explore our sexuality without the traditional guilt and
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embarrassment, but sometimes promoting all sexual desires has negative moral
consequences because it can legitimize devaluing and even hurting women,
4.4(b) Pornography Challenging Sexist Power Structures
Questioning the traditional notion that sex is dirty or wrong is not the only way in
which pornography can defy sexist social norms. Pornography can also dispute
traditional power structures by giving all sorts of people power and freedom to have sex
with each other. Sometimes, those who traditionally hold power in our societies have
none in pornography. Ann Snitow, as quoted by Nadine Strossen, explains: “Think, for
example, of all the pornography about servants fucking mistresses, old men fucking
young girls, guardians fucking wards. Class, age, custom - all are deliciously sacrificed,
dissolved by sex” (Strossen 176).
Yet, questioning traditional power structures through pornography can be
immoral because it can show that sex is a way to get and take away power. Seeing
pornography as a way to break down traditional power structures can make it appear as
though sex must be about power; but this is not the case. Pornography that promotes sex
as a way to undermine power structures can be immoral because it erotizes power
imbalances. Eroticising power structures, no matter how untraditional they may be, can
be immoral because it does not promote equality, but another version of domination.
So, sometimes pornography questions traditional power structures by showing
people who traditionally have power without it. But, pornography can also re-enact
traditional power structures and it can give the impression that power is necessarily part
of sex.
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4.4(c) Pornography Eroticising Sexist Women’s Roles
Many pro-pomography feminists believe that pornography defies traditional
sexist norms, yet many anti-pornography feminists argue that pornography actually instils
these norms. One way that it does so is by eroticizing three traditional sexist roles for
women: The first is when pornography shows women as the sexual property of men.
The second is when pornography shows that women should look ‘sexy’ for men. And the
third is when it shows that women should serve men.
4.4(c)(i) Women as Men's Property:
Pornography can reinforce the idea that women are the sexual property of men
because with pornography, men are buying and selling women for sex. Most of the
people who purchase and produce pornography are men and most of the pornographic
materials that they buy are images of women (Juffer 58). This means that through
pornography, men literally buy and sell women, if only in sexual images and acts. So, in
the context of most pornography, women are seen as the sexual objects of men. Women
are photographed and videotaped for men’s satisfaction and these images are bought and
sold among men as their property. As Dworkin explains, pomographers, “sell women:
the real flesh-and-blood women in the pictures. They like the excitement of domination;
they are greedy for profit; they are sadistic in their exploitation of women; they hate
women, and the pornography they make is the distillation of that hate.. .The exchanges of
women among them is part of the fun too” (Dworkin 27-28).
Yet, sometimes women are the ones producing and purchasing pornography.
There are many female pomographers and many women who use pornography. When
women buy and sell pornography, women cannot be considered the property of men
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though pornography because no men are involved in the transaction. Also, women who
are not coerced into making pornography are not bought and sold; only their sexual
labour and the products of it are. Thus if we were to say that pornography is only the
buying and selling of women, we would reduce these women to their commercial sexual
performances.
4.4(c)(ii) Pretty Over Pleasure:
Second, pornography can say that women are supposed to look ‘sexy’6 for men
and that looking ‘sexy’ is more important than women’s pleasure. When people watch
pornography, “[w]hat they typically see on screen - the woman’s exposed body and the
man’s orgasm - is designed to appeal to heterosexual men, yet everyone learns to see this
movie as ‘sexy’ ” (Douglass 110). In showing women on display for the pleasure of men,
it appears as though women’s appearance and not their pleasure is what is important
when it comes to sex. Thus, pornography can reinforce the sexist social norm that
women have to look ‘sexy’ to be sexually attractive because looking a certain ‘sexy’ way
is a large part of most pornography.
Not only can pornography say that women must look ‘sexy’, but it can also shape
what this means. Most pornography consists of images of white, thin, blond, young
women (Carol 164). This can give the impression that only white, young, blond and thin
women are attractive, which is a traditional sexist and racist notion that most
pornography does not question, but reinforces.
But it is not always the case that only white, young, blond and thin women are
portrayed as attractive in pornography. One man “discovered the genre of ‘average girls’

6 Pornography often promotes the idea that for a woman to look sexy, she must look thin and young, and
she must have large breasts and wear lots o f make-up.
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- women who looked like someone he might meet and have sex with, the occasional
pimple, oversized thigh and all.. .The Average Girls always looked cheerful and happy to
have sex. They seemed friendly and realistic and, above all, enthusiastic - ideally the
way women acted in real life” (Paul 76). Also, some Black and Asian sex workers find
that they are in high demand because they are not white (Nagle 199 and 207).
So, sometimes pornography says that women should conform to traditional ideals
of female beauty to be attractive, but sometimes it does not. Sometimes pornography can
say that women must be a stereotypically pretty and white to be attractive, but this is not
always the case.
4.4(c)(iii) Women Serving Men:
Pornography can perpetuate the sexist social norm that women should serve men.
One possible problem with pornography and its relationship with sexist social norms “is
that in pornography, women are always servicing men” (Paul 151). Women are often
shown “in a state of ecstasy, the plaything of her male master” (Cole, “Power” 54). Thus
pornography can perpetuate the idea that women should be submissive and that men
should be in control. “Pornography’s practice of eroticising sexual subordination is
particularly useful in the promulgation of dominant/submissive male/female gender
categories. Pornography is just one of the cultural institutions committed to this” (Cole,
“Power” 40).
But, this is not always the case. Sometimes men in pornography serve women.
Sometimes women and men are in pornography to be with, not serve, each other. For
example, feminist pomographer Candida Royalle makes films for women in which she
aims at pleasing women, not pleasing men:
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I began to write for men’s magazines and review adult movies. That was
when I started looking closely at the films and was horrified to see how
sexist they were. So I began to think about making pom movies that were
aimed at women, which couples could share together. I felt that adult
entertainment could be very valid and life-enriching, but it wasn’t being
done with that in mind. (Royalle 540)
So, sometimes pornography promotes the sexist norm that women should serve men, and
sometimes it does not. Now that I have examined how pornography can enforce sexist
social norms by eroticising traditional roles for women, I will look at how pornography
can reinforce traditional sexist ideas about what sex is.
4.4(d) Pornography Promotes Sexist Definitions o f Sex
Many anti-pornography feminists argue that pornography tends to enforce
traditional notions of what sex is in three ways: it can say that heterosexual sex is the
only option, that ‘foreplay’ does not count as sex and is not important, and that only
men’s orgasms and erections are necessary.
4.4(d)(i) Enforcing Heterosexuality:
Pornography can instil the traditional notion that heterosexual sex is the only type
of acceptable sex. Although gay and lesbian pornography is available, it is a small part of
what is easily available. Often homosexually themed materials are used for
heterosexual’s fantasies. “When you look at pornography there isn’t much lesbian stuff
there, except fodder for some heterosexual male fantasy” (Cole, “Power” 25). One
woman says that gay pornography is enjoyable because, “after a bad breakup, there is
nothing finer than watching a big sweating guy pounding the ass o f a guy who looks just
like your ex” (Aptowicz 72). This can show how even homosexually themed
pornography can be used to show that gay sex is unacceptable by describing it as a sort of
punishment, not a sexual option. Most pornography shows heterosexual sex. What little
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pornography that does depict homosexuality is often made for the consumption and
pleasure of heterosexuals. Thus pornography can instil the traditional notion that
heterosexual sex is the only acceptable type of sex.
Yet, there are some lesbian pornographic magazines and videos made for and
produced by lesbians (Juffer 123) and the gay pornography industry is quite large
(McElroy 32). So, sometimes pornography promotes only heterosexual sex and
sometimes it does not.
4.4(d)(ii) Defining Sex as Sexist:
Pornography can also give the impression that ‘foreplay’, the sexual activity that
most often brings women to orgasm, does not count as sex and does not matter. “Many
women remark on the lack of foreplay from men who watch a lot of pornography.
Because pom is typically about male gratification, it rarely takes time to plow through
any preamble” (Paul 151). This can show that not only is ‘foreplay’ not important, but
that it is also not ‘real’ sex:
Women.. .get too little and the wrong kind of stimulation. The sexual
activities that most easily bring women to orgasm are now called
‘foreplay.’ Foreplay is a dumping ground for everything - kissing,
touching, oral and manual sex - that is not intercourse.. .Most
heterosexuals engage in oral and manual sex as warm-ups for intercourse
rather than as sex that leads to orgasm.. .Men often view foreplay as a
hurdle they have to jump over in order to get to ‘sex’. (Douglass 47)
Pornography can not only say that ‘foreplay’ (i.e. what usually brings women sexual
pleasure) is not important, it can go so far as to say that men’s orgasms and erections are
the only ones that matter. Women who perform in pornography do not often reach
orgasm or even feel pleasure when they are making pornography, yet men in
pornography almost always do (McElroy 10-11). This is often said to be because women
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can have sex without erections, while men cannot. This is simply not true. It is just as
awkward and painful for women to have sex when they do not have erections as it would
be if men were to try, but because men’s erections are more obvious and because men’s
pleasure is often the focus o f sex, women’s pleasure gets pushed aside (Douglass 17-20).
However, in feminist pornography, women’s pleasure, (which includes their
orgasms, erections and ‘foreplay’) are shown as very important parts of sex. Thus some
pornography ignores women’s pleasure, while other pornography focuses on it.
4.4(e) Sexist Social Conventions Summary
Pornography can both reinforce and defy sexist social norms depending on the
situation. There are many sexist social norms that pornography has been said to both
question and reinforce. Sometimes pornography allows us to talk about sex, and
sometimes it stops discussions about sex. Pornography’s lessons that people can enjoy
sex without ties to marriage or procreation and enjoy all types of sex can be both harmful
and helpful to the lives of women. Pornography can both replay and replace traditional
power structures. It can both ensure and dispel traditional roles for women and
traditional sexist ideas about what sex is. In order to see in which situations pornography
does or does not defy sexist social traditions, we must look at the details of each situation
in which pornography is used and produced.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
Analyzing the feminist pornography debate through the lens of moral perception
theory achieves the three goals of this paper. First, it shows how this debate can be re
conceptualized to unite pro- and anti-pornography feminisms. Second, moral perception
theory can explain why definitions of pornography are problematic and finally; moral
perception shows that pornography is neither moral or immoral, but that pornography can
add to the morality or immorality of a situation depending on the particulars of the
situation. In this concluding chapter I will explain how moral perception theory has
accomplished each o f these goals.
5.1 Uniting Feminisms
The first goal o f this paper is to reconceptualize the feminist pornography debate
to allow feminists on both sides of this debate to converse with and learn from each other
instead of attacking each other’s views. Applying moral perception theory to the feminist
pornography debate has achieved this goal by showing the significance of both
acknowledging and addressing views about the morality of pornography that differ from
our own. Moral perception theory, when applied to the feminist pornography debate,
provides two remedies for moral blindness: paying close attention to those who disagree
with us about the morality of pornography and immersing ourselves in the different
situations in which pornography is used, produced and discussed.
5.1(a) Paying Close Attention
In explaining how to mitigate aversion and self-absorption blindness, Kukla’s
theory of moral perception shows the importance of paying close attention to the
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situations in which we find ourselves. Applying this remedy to the feminist pornography
debate shows that feminists on both sides of this debate need to closely attend to the
experiences and arguments of those on the other. This will discourage feminists from
ignoring each other’s ideas, and will encourage them to address the implications of what
they do perceive which will make them better able to listen to and understand each
other’s ideas about and experiences with pornography.
Paying close attention to those on the opposite side of the feminist pornography
debate helps feminists on both sides work together and learn from each other because if
they play close attention to each other, they will find it difficult to dismiss each other’s
views. Paying close attention will encourage them to address and understand what those
who disagree with them about the morality of pornography say and will help them
identify the implications others’ ideas and experiences have on their thoughts and actions.
5.1(b) Immersing Ourselves in Different Situations
In explaining how to mitigate defective and incomplete perception, moral perception
theory explains why we must immerse ourselves in the different situations in which we
find ourselves. Applying this remedy to the feminist pornography debate shows that
•

•

7

feminists on both sides of this debate should immerse themselves in the different
situations in which pornography is used, produced and discussed. This will allow them to
mitigate defective and incomplete perception because it will allow them to perceive
correctly and with enough detail to understand the different situations that aire affected by
pornography and the moral claims that they make upon us.

7 In suggesting that we immerse ourselves in the different situations in which pornography is used and
produced I do not mean to suggest that we should all produce and consume pornography. Instead, I argue
that if we want to learn about pornography, we must learn about people’s opinions about and experiences
with pornography by getting to know them and/or listening to what they have to say.
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Immersing ourselves in different situations within which people use, produce and
discuss pornography helps feminists leam from and work with each other because it
allows them to understand each other’s arguments, ideas and experiences as well as the
ones with which they are already familiar. When we understand what others say from
their situation, we are better able to understand why they hold beliefs that differ from our
own. Immersing ourselves in these different situations also helps us understand how
something, in this case pornography, can seem immoral in one situation and moral in
another. Thus feminists on both sides of this debate need not prove that the other side is
wrong about the morality of pornography. Instead, they should point out the ways in
which their experiences with and ideas about pornography are based on different
situations in which pornography is used and produced.
5.2 Defining Pornography
Deciding what does and does not fall under the category of pornography is
difficult. Although moral perception theory provides no easy answer to the question
‘what is pornography?’ it does provide an explanation as to why defining pornography is
so difficult.
There are many different definitions of pornography. Thus feminists have
difficulty debating the morality of pornography not only because of the moral blindness
in which they participate, but also because they are often talking about different things
when they talk about pornography. This discrepancy in the definitions of pornography
becomes clear when we pay attention to the particulars of the feminist pornography
debate. Feminists, and others, face two main problems with defining pornography. The
first is that when looking at an example of what might be considered pornography, it is

84

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

difficult to tell if it is pornography or if it is not by any definition. The second problem is
that definitions of pornography seem to be compatible with only one side of the
pornography debate. To highlight these two problems, and how moral perception can
help solve them, I will discuss two prominent competing definitions of pornography.
Many feminists who oppose the use and production of pornography define
pornography as sexually explicit material that subordinates women through pictures or
words (MacKinnon, “Only Words” 22). The classic example of this type of definition is
the one used in MacKinnon and Dworkin’s ordinance. MacKinnon and Dworkin define
pornography as:
the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically depicted,
whether in pictures or in words, that also include one or more of the
following: (i) women are presented as dehumanized sexual objects, things
or commodities; or (ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy
pain or humiliation; or (iii) women are presented as sexual objects who
experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (iv) women are presented as
sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt;
or (v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission; [or sexual
servility, including inviting penetration] or (vi) women’s body parts including but not limited to vaginas, breasts and buttocks - are exhibited,
such that women are reduced to these parts; or (vii) women are presented
as whores by nature; or (viii) women are presented being penetrated by
objects or animals; or (ix) women are presented in scenarios of
degradation, injury, abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior,
bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
(McElroy 46-47)
This definition highlights a distinction between pornography and other sexually explicit
materials. The point o f this distinction is to show that what promotes sexuality without
promoting sexism is moral, but what combines the promotion o f sexism with sex - i.e.
pornography - is immoral. If this definition were easy to apply, it would make it easier
to eliminate sexually explicit material that causes harm because it would require that we
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eliminate all pornography with no need to further divide pornography into moral and
immoral categories.
Many pro-pomography feminists consider this definition to be an attack on their
views about pornography because if pornography is defined as immoral, then those who
advocate for the use o f pornography are either wrong or immoral. Thus many believe
that this definition of pornography is not a definition at all, but a way to avoid discussing
the morality o f pornography by pre-emptively defining it as immoral (McElroy 47).
McElroy argues that this definition of pornography should be avoided because
definitions should describe objects and ideas, not our attitudes towards them. But, as
moral perception theory explains, what does and what does not express our attitudes
towards something can change from situation to situation. Thus it is not necessarily
possible to define pornography without stating our opinions about it. This can be seen in
examining the definition o f pornography that McElroy considers neutral.
She defines pornography as “the explicit artistic depiction of men and/or women
as sexual beings” (McElroy 51). Yet, many of the terms in this definition may not be
considered neutral. She believes that the term ‘explicit’ helps differentiate between
women’s romance novels and actual pornography (McElroy 51), but many women find
romance novels sexually explicit. She also believes that the word ‘artistic’ differentiates
between actual pornography and textbook diagrams of bodies (McElroy 51). Yet, many
people find these drawings to be artistic. This definition is no more or less neutral than
the ordinance definition of pornography; it just highlights different distinctions. Antipornography feminists usually want to highlight the distinction between what does and
does not promote sexism and violence towards women, while McElroy wants to highlight
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the differences between art and educational materials, and graphic and non-graphic
depictions and descriptions of sex. The two problems with defining pornography can be
demonstrated by these competing definitions.
5.2(a) Biased Definitions
Feminists on each side of the pornography debate may feel that certain definitions
of pornography are unfair to their opinions about the morality o f pornography. Antipornography feminists may find that McElroy’s definition (and others like it) is not
helpful because it makes it seem as though the effects of pornography on people’s lives
are unimportant. While McElroy finds MacKinnon’s and Dworkin’s definition of
pornography incompatible with theories of pornography (like McElroy’s) which claim
that pornography is moral because their definition defines pornography as immoral.
So, if feminists want to decide upon a working definition of pornography, it is
important that they decide which distinctions they would like to highlight. It is also
important that they recognise that the same image may be considered pornographic in one
situation and non-pomographic in another.
5.2(b) Difficulty Applying Definitions
These two definitions also show the difficulty in applying definitions of
pornography. For example, an image of a pouting woman wearing straps of leather who
is chained to a wall may be considered either pornographic or not depending on the
situations in which it is used, regardless of which definition is applied to it.
5.2(b)(i) Ordinance Definition:
In some situations this image may be perceived as objectifying the woman in it.
Thus this image would be considered pornography under (iv) of the ordinance definition
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because it appears as though the woman in this image is depicted as a tied-up sexual
object. While in other situations the same image would not be seen as objectifying the
woman in it. Many people practice a sexuality in which it is the bound person who
actually has the control in the sexual relationship. For the people who practice this type
of sexuality, this image would not be considered pornography under the ordinance
definition because the woman bound in the image will not appear to be objectified, but to
be control.
5.2(b)(ii) McElroy Definition:
This same image can be considered either pornographic or not according to
McElroy’s definition as well. Some may consider this image sexually explicit because of
the clothing that this women is wearing, because of the expression on her face, or even
just because she is tied-up. While, in other situations this image will not be considered
pornography because it does not depict any sexual acts, nor is the woman in the image
naked.
These examples show that what counts as pornography is different from one
situation to the next, regardless of which definition is used. Thus the reason why
definitions of pornography are so difficult to apply to actual objects and activities are
because what counts as sexual, explicit, degrading, objectify etc., varies from situation to
situation. This explains why MacKinnon and Dworkin’s own books have been censored
as pornography by their own definition: the situations in which these books are censored
are much different from the situations in which MacKinnon and Dworkin write. So,
when they include graphic descriptions of rape and other types of sexual assault in their
books to explain the immorality of pornography, they are often censored as pornography
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by their own definition (Strossen 59-60). This is because what counts as degrading and
violent to them, is not what counts as degrading and violent to those who censor their
works.
Thus, we cannot decide if a certain image is pornography or is not without
knowledge of the situations in which it is used and produced, regardless of which
definition of pornography is used. We can only decide if an image is or is not
pornography within a given situation. The difficulty with these definitions is that they
attempt to define pornography by the situations in which it is found, but these situations
vary. Thus we cannot tell the difference between what is explicit and what is not, without
knowledge of the situation in which the possible pornography is used and created.
5.3 Morality of Pornography
The final goal of this paper is to find a way to make sense of the apparently
conflicting information about the morality of pornography. Plenty of evidence suggests
that the phrase ‘pornography is moral’ is true and plenty of evidence to supports the
opposite conclusion. Immersing ourselves in the different situations in which
pornography is used, produced and discussed provides a way to make sense of the
conflicting information available about the morality of pornography.
Moral perception theory shows that it is not that the statement ‘pornography is
immoral’ is either true or false, but that it can appear to be either true or false, depending
on the particulars of the situations in which it is used and produced. This means that we
need not show that some of the information available about the morality of pornography
is wrong while some is right, but that we must understand that pornography can add
either to the morality or immorality of a situation, depending on the particulars of the

89

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

situation. Instead of trying to decide the truth about the morality of pornography, we
should use information about the morality of pornography to learn how to tell the
difference between situations in which pornography adds to or detracts from the morality
of the situations in which it is used and produced.
Once we learn to tell this difference, we can see that neither side of the feminist
pornography debate is more correct than the other about the morality o f pornography and
that none of the information available on the morality of pornography conflicts with the
rest. Instead, we are presented with different opinions and conclusions about the morality
of pornography, regardless of which definition we choose, because pornography has
different effects on the morality of situations depending upon the particulars of these
situations. So, none of the opinions about the morality of pornography are wrong, they
are just based upon different situations in which pornography is used and produced.
Thus, it is not that certain sexually themed films, images, books or actions are
moral or immoral, but that their effects on the situations in which they are used and
produced are. In recognizing this fact feminists on both sides of the pornography debate
can learn to differentiate between the situations in which sexually themed objects and
actions make situations worse and those when it makes them better. In doing so they can
work together to (and figure out how to) promote those situations in which what can be
considered pornography adds to the morality of the situations and limit those situations in
which what can be considered pornography adds to the immorality of the situation. This
will hopefully dissolve the line between pro- and anti-pornography feminisms, reuniting
feminists on this issue.
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Note that this does not mean that we must allow the negative effects of and
requirements for pornography, regardless of how we choose to define it, to occur because
the same pornography, in another situation, could have a positive effect or feminist
source. For example, we needn’t argue that videos in which a series of men take turns
ejaculating on a young woman’s face (Jensen 28-29) are actually quite feminist because
ejaculating on women’s faces is really just men’s way of trying to share in women’s
ability to breastfeed, and this activity is exciting for this woman because it is her
opportunity to share in her partners’ orgasms (McElroy 135-136), when this is not the
case. This would be tantamount to arguing that calling someone a rude name is really not
rude because the same word in a different language may mean something quite nice. So,
as much as we must pay attention to the particulars of situations in order to find out if
pornography adds to the morality or immorality of situations, we do not have to excuse
behaviour that is immoral just because it is possible that it might be moral in another
situation. It is important to notice the difference between looking at situations to see the
many different ways in which certain images can be interpreted, and thinking of possible
situations in which what does have immoral effects in the present situation could have
positive moral effects upon another and thus seeing this type of pornography as moral in
the situation in which it is promoting sexism. In conclusion, moral perception theory,
when applied to the feminist pornography debate, shows that there are no moral or
immoral aspects of pornography that we need to reconcile or deny. Moral perception
shows that pornography is neither moral nor immoral, but that it can add to either the
morality or immorality o f a situation depending on the particulars o f the situation in
which it is used and produced.
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